

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A931

dom. We must guard it well, so that future generations will enjoy true democracy.

Our country is now in the midst of a cold war. We are caught in a struggle of forces from outside as well as from inside the United States. These crises are testing our ability to carry out our responsibilities as citizens who are sincerely interested in the welfare of their country. Can we pass this test? We must. For, it is our generation which must cope with these problems. If our freedom is to survive, it is up to us.

In the words of Franklin Delano Roosevelt:

"To some generations, much is given. From some generations, much is expected. This generation of Americans has a rendezvous with destiny."

The Nation's Traffic Toll

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN A. RACE

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 3, 1965

Mr. RACE. Mr. Speaker, the Nation's traffic toll is certainly a concern of most Americans. Television station WTMJ in Milwaukee, Wis., has some interesting comments on this serious problem, which I would like to call to the attention of my colleagues:

Many times simple devices have solved old and troublesome problems. Take the case of Oconomowoc with its many grade crossings and high-speed trains running through the center of the city. Fifty-one persons died and hundreds of others were injured in train-auto crashes in Oconomowoc since 1911. Several months ago the city installed stop signs at all its crossings. While this apparently has solved Oconomowoc's problem, the city is going even further by eliminating some of the crossings.

Nationwide, as in Wisconsin, the traffic safety record is a disgrace. That's why our stations are promoting a 10-point safety code for legislation designed to cope with the problem. Take another simple device, a seat belt. It gives an occupant of a car a five times better chance of escaping death in an accident than one who doesn't wear it. Yet many people who have belts in their cars don't use them.

It's a strange situation when most automobile buyers seem to be more interested in horsepower and body style than they are about safety factors. As a result, the Federal Government has found it necessary to act. Its General Services Administration, which buys 50,000 automobiles a year for Federal use, has set down some rugged safety features for the 1967 models it purchases.

On its own, the auto industry has brought about many safety innovations throughout the years. The Government is prodding it to do more. Only recently the industry announced its 1966 models would be equipped with rear as well as front seat belts. The Government is demanding the rear belts for its cars and lap and shoulder belts for the front seats, in addition to several other safety features.

Following last year's toll of 47,000 highway deaths, Congress is exhibiting even greater concern over the problem. Wisconsin's Senator NELSON not only has proposed that the devices demanded for Federal cars be built into autos purchased by the public, he also has urged that the Government develop a prototype safety car. One of the first things

Governor Knowles did upon taking office was to pledge his administration to a concerted attack on the highway accident rate.

Despite all these efforts, there will still be a need for the drivers themselves to adopt an attitude which puts safety first.

America Afflicted by Poor Mouth Syndrome

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. SAMUEL L. DEVINE

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 3, 1965

Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Speaker, on the day the House is rushing headlong into the so-called Appalachia panacea, I think Jenkin Lloyd Jones' column "America Afflicted by Poor Mouth Syndrome" is most appropriate.

The column follows:

AMERICA AFFLICTED BY POOR MOUTH SYNDROME

Like hogs grunting to the trough, Congressmen are clamoring to get their districts declared "Appalachias."

The President's original Appalachia uplift plan has called for an initial expenditure of a billion dollars in 11 States along the Appalachian Ridge.

Now Senator JOHN McCLELLAN has come up with an amendment to the Appalachia bill to include 36 Missouri counties and 21 Arkansas counties. Senator FRED HARRIS wants to add 19 Oklahoma counties. Senator EDWARD KENNEDY says "We in New England must be ready to advise the President of our needs when this new legislation (Appalachia) becomes effective." Senator JOSEPH MONTOYA is insisting that the entire four corners country of New Mexico, Colorado, Arizona, and Utah be Appalachianized. Who wants to bet that the Appalachians won't soon reach clear to Alaska?

In the old days it was the custom of American communities to boast of their wealth, or at least their bright prospects. The homestead dodgers glowed with promise. The railroad agents regaled immigrants with Utopian visions. The boom towns sent forth their bands and booster trains. And the chamber of commerce tradition, the think-big, can-do, talk-it-up brand of self-hypnotism started in America when Capt. John Smith described the miasmatic swamps of Jamestown Island as a "faire and prettye land."

But while Charles Dickens saw only America's mud, bad table manners, and spittoons, and while Sinclair Lewis and H. L. Mencken hooted at our Babbitisms, this American habit of putting up a bold front and flashing a toothpaste smile paid fantastic dividends. The tent towns became shack towns and the shacks gave way to paint and trim. Your community was supposed to be a proud thing. This pride made a great nation. The immigrant may have come from a Moldavian village that had drawn water from the same well for a thousand years, but 5 years after his arrival at a signpost along the Kansas railroad he was burning his fingers on sky-rockets to celebrate the opening of the town waterworks.

But now we weep for Appalachia. A legend grows. Millions of Americans are allegedly held prisoners in accursed regions. They are, to use the euphemisms of the hour, "disadvantaged," "deprived," "underprivileged." They must be rescued by a vast and special outpouring of Federal funds.

So appealing is this myth of the trapped and downtrodden Appalachian that just before Christmas, when the Columbia Broadcasting System put out a heart-rending documentary on eastern Kentucky, 150 tons of goods and \$57,000 in cash were rushed to the region by distressed Americans.

Now, maybe we ought to knock off some of the sentimental sobbing and political hand-wringing about America's Appalachias and ask ourselves how come.

Some regions are in trouble because coal loaders have replaced bituminous miners. Some are in a jam because oil and gas are better and cheaper fuels than anthracite. The miner who was thrown out of work after 40 needs special consideration. He must either be retrained into a marketable skill or supported in some degree for the rest of his life.

But there is usually a good economic reason why an industry has not hurried into Appalachia. And there must be a limit to the sympathy productive Americans should lavish on the able-bodied man who sits on his cabin porch year after year waiting for someone to bring him a job.

County Judge Willie Kirk, of Martin County, Ky., said last month: "You'll find about 80 percent of our people just looking for another handout." And he added that some local families have been unemployed for three generations.

If the roads through Appalachia are poor they are at least passable. A young man can get out. And in three generations someone else has built Houston, Phoenix, Los Angeles, Anchorage, and Honolulu.

Appalachia is no stranger to the Federal dollar. The entire TVA is in Appalachia. The gigantic \$1.2 billion Arkansas River project will touch many of the counties which Senators McCLELLAN and HARRIS would add to Appalachia. The Four Corners country is the home of some of our most expensive and most dubious reclamation schemes.

But worst of all is the Appalachia psychology. Is our famous local pride going to be replaced by poor-mouth contests? Are Americans going to put on their dirtiest shirts and raggedest fishing pants and go crying their deprivations and disadvantages to Washington?

That isn't the way this country was built and it will not be the formula for its preservation.

Obsolete and Duplicated Agricultural Research

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. THOMAS C. McGRATH

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 3, 1965

Mr. McGRATH. Mr. Speaker, in the Washington Daily News edition of Monday, March 1, there appeared an editorial which presented a thoughtful case for the administration's attempt to reduce or eliminate obsolete and duplicated agricultural research.

The editorial, entitled "Bamboozled," read as follows:

The administration makes a clear and sensible case in its proposal to reduce or eliminate obsolete, inefficient and duplicated agricultural research. It deserves the support of Congress and encouragement to act further.

Why, for example, should the taxpayers continue paying for research on bamboo,

A932

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

March 3

which isn't even grown commercially in this country? They shouldn't.

What remains to be taught farmers about breeding of rabbits? Little, if anything.

What is left, after almost 60 years, to be learned about irrigation and dryland farming in certain areas? Very little.

Why shouldn't private industry take over research into fabrics, kitchen design and food wholesaling? It should.

As is already obvious, many Congressmen—economy- and efficiency-minded Congressmen, mind you—are screaming. They are alarmed at the loss of hometown, home-State boondoggling. But they are yelping up the wrong tree—bamboo or other—we think.

I commend this editorial to my fellow Members and urge that they give thought to its message.

Successful Flight of Ranger VIII Gives Space Program a Big Boost

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 3, 1965

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include an article by Bill Gold which appeared in the February 20, 1965 edition of the Washington Post which to me conveys an atmosphere which I have found to exist in many people's minds, that they are now believing this country can put a man on the moon. At the very least, they believe we are now capable of doing it, which in my mind is more important than actually placing a man there.

DISTANT TOMORROW IS NEAR AT HAND

Ranger VIII was "right on the money" at last report. If all goes well, it will have landed on the moon by the time this newspaper is placed at your front door. Scientists hope to get 4,000 pictures from Ranger VIII, and they say that this batch may be better than the photographs produced by Ranger VII last July.

The pictures last summer stirred my imagination to unaccustomed levels of activity. If today's pictures are better, I may have to withdraw into a fanciful world of my own for a few days until the effect wears off.

Speculation about exploring the moon didn't excite me much at first because the idea seemed as farfetched as a science-fiction plot. This wasn't a project that I really expected to see undertaken in my time. It was a dream for some distant tomorrow—and I'm too preoccupied with trying to survive today to worry about distant tomorrows.

But here we are moving in for closeups already, and even my reactionary mind is willing to accept the likelihood that the next step will follow shortly: we will land a camera on the moon gently enough for it to continue to send back on-the-spot pictures.

Is it possible to contemplate this eventuality without tingling a bit at the prospect and wondering: "What will we see?"

The accuracy of the world's scientific community has been uncanny in recent years. Specialists in several fields have been able to foretell what would happen when we passed previously uncrossed boundaries. They've been able to predict much of what

would be found in vast areas into which no man had ever ventured.

Yet there have also been surprises for our scientists—things they hadn't expected to encounter.

And one must now wonder what sorts of surprises the moon will hold for us, and what sorts of new vistas it will open.

People sometimes ask whether we're spending too much on our moon projects, but I've never been concerned over the question. I have the feeling that the times force decisions of this kind on people. The circumstances that prevail at historic moments produce reactions that move men inexorably in the only direction that seems natural under those circumstances.

When the Russians put up their first sputnik, our leaders spoke slightly of the achievement. Emmet John Hughes says in "The Ordeal of Power": "Sherman Adams, in a rare display of shallow partisanship, disparaged all public concern with 'an outer space basketball game.'" Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, who had just retired from office, called it "a nice technical trick." President Eisenhower assured reporters that "the satellite itself . . . does not raise my apprehensions, not one iota."

But it seemed very plain to most people that a new door had been opened into the heavens, that others had already passed through that door for a glimpse of what lay on the other side, and that either we'd join the mass movement in that direction or we'd be left behind.

So we joined the mass movement. It seemed to me that there was never any doubt about what we'd do. There are strange and wonderful mysteries out there in the universe, and instinct tells us to pursue them.

It's hard to believe that we're now almost ready to take this next big step into space. The years ahead may turn out to be the most rewarding in history—especially if we don't blow ourselves up in an atomic war meantime.

We Set the Example in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 3, 1965

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Dancy in his editorial of February 27, 1965, in the Peoria Journal Star points out that we must bear a heavy share of responsibility for so-called political events in Vietnam. I pointed out in my radio broadcast of February 18, 1965, that a dangerous school of thought prevailed within the administration at the time of the murder of Diem. When we proceeded on the assumption that political reform had to come before military victory, we were on dangerous ground. I have been told by one in good authority that to the chief of state of another country, friendly to the United States, the murder of Diem meant just three things: It is dangerous to be a friend of the United States; it pays to be a neutral; it sometimes helps to be an enemy.

Mr. Speaker, Charles Dancy points out as I did in my broadcast that this same deadly pattern seems to be engulfing some of our policy decisions in Vietnam today. Under unanimous consent, I include the editorial at this point:

WE SET THE EXAMPLE IN VIETNAM

(By C. L. Dancy)

As the game of musical chairs continues in South Vietnam's Government, let us face the obvious truth that we bear a heavy share of responsibility for these political events.

It is all very well for Senator MANSFIELD to get up in the Senate and pronounce that we are getting tired of the jealous generals who are endangering the safety of South Vietnam by their endless coups.

It is all very well for our Government to complain bitterly about the failures to establish a civilian government.

But we only have to go back to where this whole series of military coups and military rule began to face the fact that we set the example, we started it, and we established the precedent.

We wanted to get rid of Diem, who we felt wasn't doing as good a job as could be done, and wasn't pushing the reforms we wanted in the civil life of the nation. All doubtless true and valid criticism.

And we got rid of him—but how?

We announced that we were dissatisfied with Diem. We announced that we didn't believe the military leaders supported some Diem actions—an announcement openly described at the time by all observers as a straight out invitation to the military to depose Diem.

Then we spelled it out further by leaking information that we expected him to be overthrown.

Finally, we spelled it out flatly by cutting off funds to Diem's personal troops and government and continuing funds to the army units under more or less independent commands. And who knows what else via our secret agents?

Diem's overthrow in the first of the military coups followed, amid considerable joy and self-congratulation in Washington, D.C.—dampened only by the sobering item that he was also assassinated.

We promptly endorsed the new military government.

Then, we started to talk about reforms and a civilian government.

But actions speak louder than words. Example is a more effective teacher than the finest of statements of principle.

The action was before them. The example was before them. The precedent was before them. The experience was before them, that the road to power is a military coup.

We thus established a climate in which every officer of rank could dream of being the head of the nation, and of achieving that position at a single stroke by the technique we had just taught them.

The coups have followed endlessly.

And now we throw up our hands in despair and contempt at those ungrateful, foolish, irresponsible, undemocratic, doublecrossing, jealous generals.

This is not the way we educated them to act, we say. It's hard to teach these people how to operate.

That excuse is not true. This may not be the way we educated them to act in our military classrooms for Vietnamese officers, but this is precisely the way we educated them to act in practice.

We cannot duck our full share of responsibility for the political mess in Vietnam.

We set it up.

We outsmarted ourselves.

We refused to recognize the practical and earthy effects of our own actions.

And it is with sadness and frustration, not with pride, that we at this newspaper add that we were close enough to the grassroots and far enough from the ivory tower to be fearful of just this sort of thing, and to have expressed our fear that our policy was setting off a chain political reaction at the outset.

Sad because of the consequences to our country and the cause of freedom.

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A933

Frustrated because if someone no closer to the scene than we could see this seemingly obvious down-to-earth result, somebody in the high council of this Nation ought to have seen it, certainly.

But we didn't see a single "liberal" voice raised against a military coup and a military dictatorship engineered by our liberal Government.

It struck us as just another example of how flexible the liberal moral principles and boasted high ideals are when it is a question of raw power used to further their own projects.

They only hate power when it is in someone else's hands, it seems, in far too many cases. And in such cases, the self-styled liberal is no liberal at all. He is a fake.

It's a distinction that needs to be made if we are to make sense out of our own politics here in the United States, as well as in places like South Vietnam.

San Diego Pilot Wins His 11th Air Medal

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. BOB WILSON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 3, 1965

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Speaker, it is fitting in view of the great many dedicated Americans currently serving in Vietnam that I should call my colleagues attention to the exceptional service and dedication exemplified there by a fellow San Diego citizen, Capt. Howard Shook. Just recently he was awarded his 11th Air Medal because of his relentless and honorable service in our behalf. The following article appeared on February 24 in the San Diego Union and it speaks well of our pride in counting this brave man as a fellow citizen:

SAN DIEGO PILOT WINS HIS 11TH AIR MEDAL IN VIETNAMESE WAR

TAY NINH, SOUTH VIETNAM.—Capt. Howard Shook of San Diego waited a long time to fly. He was 13 when he soloed. Now he is a much-decorated U.S. Air Force pilot in strife-torn Vietnam—forward air controller with the 2d Air Division. He has won 11 Air Medals for his missions over Vietnam.

Shook began flying as a crop duster to pay his way through San Diego State. It paid off. He made it, with a few dollars to spare.

TO VIETNAM

The captain was assigned to Vietnam in February 1964. He was sent here to one of the most Vietcong-infested areas in the country.

"It was an interesting welcome I received at Tay Ninh Province," he grins. "The province chief assured me that 90 percent of the land here is owned by the Vietcong."

For 10 months Shook was the only U.S. Air Force officer in the Army compound at Tay Ninh.

While the forward air controller normally flies the O-1F, a single-engine light plane used for marking targets for the heavier bombers—the A-1E's and A-1H's—Shook also has worked with the ground troops.

In June, for example, Shook directed an air strike from the ground, working with Vietnamese troops. It turned out to be one of the largest air strikes of the Vietnamese conflict.

Shook recalls that there were 26 sorties of A-1E's and A-1H's in a 4-hour period. The ground count later confirmed more than 300 Vietcong were killed by fire from the air.

Groundwork is only part of Shook's mission. As forward air controller he has flown more than 500 sorties over Vietnam.

SEVEN PLANES USED

"Hits?" he laughs. "Yes, I've had my share. The O-1F is not armor plated, you know. It absorbs ground fire like a towed target on the gunnery range."

Shook says he used up seven airplanes in a year. Each received so much battle damage it had to be replaced.

Finally the law of averages caught up with Shook. He was wounded when a .30-caliber machinegun bullet came up through the canopy, the windshield and the right window of his plane.

"The plexiglas seemed to explode," Shook said. "Although I was hit in the forehead and right arm with shrapnel from the blasted compass on the instrument panel, it really didn't amount to much. I flew the plane back and landed without any trouble."

Shook soon plans to return to his wife, Barbara, at 4530 37th Street, San Diego, for leave before reporting to Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. Then he'll be back in jet fighters again.

Iowa Strings Near Perfection

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 3, 1965

Mr. SCHMIDHAUSER. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have this opportunity to commend the Iowa String Quartet of the University of Iowa and the players Allen Ohmes and John Ferrell, violins; William Pruecl, viola; and Joel Krosnick, cello; for an outstanding performance here in Washington, D.C.

These musicians are examples of the excellence which Iowans have attained in many areas. The southeast section of the great State of Iowa, particularly Iowa City is rapidly becoming the cultural center of the Midwest. I am proud to represent this district in Congress.

I invite the attention of my colleagues to the remarks made by Donald M. McCorkle, music critic, in the Washington, D.C., Evening Star of March 1, 1965. To allow my colleagues and readers of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the opportunity of learning more of these Iowa musicians, under unanimous consent I include the Star's statements in the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

IOWA STRINGS NEAR PERFECTION

(By Donald M. McCorkle)

(Iowa String Quartet (Allen Ohmes and John Ferrell, violins; William Pruecl, viola; Joel Krosnick, cello). At the Phillips Collection. Program: Quartet in A, K. 464, Mozart; String Quartet, Op. 3, Berg; Quartet in E Minor, Op. 44, No. 2 Mendelssohn.)

The first thing one noticed at yesterday afternoon's concert at the Phillips Collection was the extraordinarily fine quality of the program book, which was designed for the entire 1964-65 season of the Iowa String Quartet, both at home and on tour. The program notes by the University of Iowa's musicologist, E. Eugene Helm, are a model of brilliant annotation.

The second thing one noticed was the extraordinarily fine atmosphere and acoustics at the Phillips Collection recital hall, a combination offering perfect incentive for a perfect concert.

With these admirable requisites at hand, it was possibly inevitable that the performance by the Iowa String Quartet would be very near perfection, and it was. These four players played a brilliant performance of an extremely formidable program of Mozart, Berg, and Mendelssohn. Their playing was so secure and superb that one was able to concentrate entirely on the composers' techniques, rather than on the players' techniques which often obscure the music.

The Mozart A Major Quartet, K. 464 strikes the hearing as being among the most romantic pieces Mozart ever wrote. It combines exquisite contrapuntal, interweaving lines with a thick and rich texture rarely found in Mozart. The lovely Andante is a bitter-sweet masterpiece.

If the Mozart was golden, the Alban Berg was more nearly like stainless steel, with its sharp cutting edge, precision, and cold beauty. It's an early work, and so lacks the mature lyricism of the Violin Concerto. All in all, it's an almost oppressive quartet, for the two movements are long, thick, dissonant, contrapuntal, and of utmost melodic and rhythmic complexity.

In places there is some comic relief, as in the wonderful glissandos and sinister tremolos in the second movement.

After intermission the quartet shifted to the silver of Mendelssohn, for the exquisite E Minor Quartet. As with the rest of the program, this was magnificently performed, with each part perfectly blended and full-bodied, and the broad contours and details excellently sculpted.

The Iowa String Quartet played with superb precision, warmth, and artistry, and leaves little doubt that it is among the very first rank of American University string quartets.

Independence of Morocco

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ADAM C. POWELL

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 3, 1965

Mr. POWELL. Mr. Speaker, today marks the ninth anniversary of the independence of Morocco. On this momentous occasion, we would like to extend warm felicitations to His Majesty King Hassan II; and to His Excellency Ali Bengelloun, the Moroccan Ambassador to the United States.

Independence days are of great significance to new members of the world's community of nations. We should, at the same time, not forget the opportunity they afford us of recalling the past and evaluating the present. This is the ninth anniversary of Morocco—a recently independent country, yet one of the oldest independent monarchies in the world.

The first recorded inhabitants of Morocco were the Berbers, whom all the civilizations of the ancient world fought in order to establish their outposts there. The Phoenicians and the Carthaginians established trading posts along both the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts; following them came the Romans, who built cities at Tangier, Volubilis, and many other places, the ruins of which are still visible today. When the Roman Empire declined, the Vandal tribes crossed the straits and invaded the northern coast. By the middle of the seventh century

A.D., the only remnant of the glory of Rome was the city-state of Ceuta, governed in the name of the eastern Roman Empire.

In the latter half of the seventh century the Arab armies, sweeping out of the Arabian Peninsula to spread Islam to the world, entered Morocco. Nearly the entire population of the country, including the Berber tribesmen, were converted to the new faith, and the conquering armies of Islam moved in new directions—this time across the Straits of Gibraltar into Spain and southern France.

The fierce independence of the Berbers, as well as the spread of heterodox ideas within the new religion, however, soon led to a rebellion in Morocco, which had as its consequence the rise of several small Muslim principalities. The first of the great Muslim dynasties to rule Morocco, the Idrisids, arose soon thereafter, attempting to unify the many smaller units into one whole. They founded the city of Fez, which became a notable center of Muslim life and civilization. And, they can be considered the founders of the first Moroccan state, indicating it might be more accurate for us today to be celebrating the 1,200th anniversary of that country's independence.

Over the years, other dynasties rose to take the place of previous ones when their energy and ability had waned. There were the famous Al-Moravids, who established Morocco as one of the great medieval powers. They extended their power and influence across North Africa and into Muslim Spain, thus bringing Morocco into the rich milieu of Andalusian civilization, which has left its indelible print on Moroccan life and culture. The Al-Moravids were replaced by the Al-Mohades, who kept Morocco as the greatest Muslim Empire of the West and led the country through one of its golden ages. They in turn were replaced by the Merinids and the Saadian Kings until the 17th century, when the family which guides the destiny of Morocco to the present day arose. Known usually as the Alawi House, and under their able rule, Morocco was thoroughly pacified and solidly united.

We as Americans have good reason to have friendly feelings toward this family, for Morocco under their rule was one of the first powers in the world to recognize our independence; the early treaties of friendship, trade, and good relations were drafted and signed by men such as Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and George Washington, who had reason to appreciate Morocco's recognition and assistance.

Were it not for the brief period of colonial rule between 1912 and 1956, we could even be celebrating the 306th anniversary of the accession of the present house, whose vigor and popularity is demonstrated by their leadership of Morocco in the 20th century in regaining independence. Under the present King, Hasan II, Morocco is making great strides in all fields of activity. Able, energetic, and democratic, he has given the country a new constitution, promoted foreign investment, and is determined to

bring about the rapid economic development of his country.

On this anniversary of Morocco's independence, we salute that country's people, king, and the goals for which they strive together. We hope that together they will soon create in Morocco a new golden age for that historic country.

Julian "Pappy" Van Winkle

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CHARLES P. FARNSLEY

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 3, 1965

Mr. FARNSLEY. Mr. Speaker, Kentucky lost a famous and highly regarded citizen on February 16 with the death of Julius P. Van Winkle, the dean of American bourbonmakers.

Mr. Van Winkle did much for Kentucky and for the industry of which his company is a respected member.

I wish to include at this point an editorial from the Louisville Courier-Journal of February 18 and several other articles that appeared in other prominent publications in tribute to Mr. Van Winkle.

The articles follow:

[From the Louisville (Ky.) Courier-Journal, Feb. 18, 1965]

HE WAS A GRAND OLD KENTUCKIAN

Julian "Pappy" Van Winkle, the grand old man of the Kentucky bourbon industry, is dead at 90, and with him died a little of the tradition, lore, and, yes, blarney, that have made Kentucky famous.

Van Winkle was old-fashioned, conservative, and opinionated, and he wanted everyone to know it. He was also a consummate salesman who knew that a Nation of gray-flannel conformists secretly admires the homespun virtues.

Legions of magazine readers will miss the stern yet kindly face that stared them right in the eye from the masthead of his advertisements. Indirectly, his promotions did much to benefit Kentucky. For instance, as the oldest active distilling company executive in the Nation until his retirement last October, he could make the unique claim that all 90 Kentucky Derbies were run in his lifetime.

His advice, like his marvelous stories about life in Danville, was worth listening to. He invited people to enjoy his product the same way he did—in moderation.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, Feb. 18, 1965]

JULIAN P. VAN WINKLE, 90, DIES—LONGTIME DISTILLER OF BOURBON

LOUISVILLE, Ky.—Julian P. Van Winkle the dean of American bourbon makers, died at his home here last night. He was 90 years old.

Mr. Van Winkle had been ill for several months and had retired as president of Stitzel-Weller Distillery in October. He continued as honorary chairman of the board.

Mr. Van Winkle was in the distilling business for 71 years, starting as a salesman with W. L. Weiler & Sons, wholesale whiskey firm.

Mr. Van Winkle eventually became co-owner of the concern and then bought the Stitzel Bros. distillery. He assumed the presidency of Stitzel-Weller in 1934 and held that post until he retired in October.

For Mr. Van Winkle, the old-fashioned way of making whiskey was always the best way and he at one time noted:

"We have a sign on our distillery door saying 'no chemists are allowed on this place'."

One of his concern's most famous products was Old Fitzgerald and Mr. Van Winkle said the process he had not changed since he began making it.

Mr. Van Winkle, an 1894 graduate of Centre College, gained national notice with a series of advertisements in magazines that recounted homespun Kentucky anecdotes.

He is survived by his widow, the former Katie Smith; a son, Julian P. Jr., and a daughter, Mrs. Charles K. McClure.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Feb. 18, 1965]

"PAPPY" VAN WINKLE, 90, PUBLICIZED FIRM'S WHISKY

LOUISVILLE, Ky.—Julian P. "Pappy" Van Winkle, 90, who publicized his firm's bourbon whiskey in chatty advertisements filled with anecdotes from his own days as a salesman, died Monday at his home here.

Mr. Van Winkle, former president of the Stitzel-Weller distillery, was the oldest active distillery executive in the Nation until he retired last October.

As a 19-year-old he went to work as a salesman for the W. L. Weiler & Sons wholesale whiskey firm in Louisville, travelling through Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, and West Virginia.

Later he and another salesman bought the firm, then acquired Stitzel Bros. distillery. Mr. Van Winkle was president from 1934 until he stepped down in favor of his son, Julian, Jr., last year.

His personally written advertisements were classics, sliding in the selling message with gentle indirectness. He began one, "A northern visitor once came to our Kentucky town as usual, fell in love with its equable climate, its friendly people, its unhurried way of life. 'Ah, this is God's country,' he remarked one day, his nose deep in a leafy julep. 'Course it is,' agreed his Southern host. 'You didn't think God was a Yankee, did you?'"

And suddenly just as chattily, Mr. Van Winkle was selling bourbon. "Not least, among nature's bounties to Kentucky," the ad went on, "is the mellow bourbon which inspired our visitor's expansiveness."

[From the Tap & Tavern, Feb. 22, 1965]

INDUSTRY PAYS WARM TRIBUTE TO VAN WINKLE

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Leaders of the distilling industry last week joined in paying tribute to Julian P. "Pappy" Van Winkle, 90, recently retired proprietor of Stitzel-Weller Distillery, who died at his home in Louisville, Ky., after an illness of a few months.

Robert W. Coyne, president of the Distilled Spirits Institute, described the far-famed Kentuckian as "a very real example of Americana."

Walter J. Devlin, chairman of the board of D.S.I. and vice president of the Fleischman Distilling Corp., described the dean of the industry as "a full-bodied legend in his own time."

Frederick J. Lind, vice president of Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., who recently relinquished the D.S.I. board chairmanship to Devlin, said, "The alcoholic beverage industry would not have been the same without 'Pappy' Van Winkle and his uncompromising faith and purpose."

Coyne's statement read:

"A very real example of Americana has departed the scene with the passing of the beloved 'Pappy' Van Winkle."

"This forthright Kentuckian was a champion of the free enterprise system and an advocate of quality first in his product. One of the few remaining preprohibition dis-

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3935

tol, the White House, and other historic shrines. They do not expect to enjoy the tax-free advantages available to employees of foreign governments, but they would seem to be justified in protesting the disdainful attitude of some DPL drivers toward owners of cars bearing nothing more than the tags issued by one of the 50 States or the District of Columbia.

Last summer a Pennsylvania visitor rode downtown one morning with three other ordinary Americans off to earn the wages that are left after deductions for foreign aid and other normal government expenses. At an intersection on California Street NW., the driver of a car bearing DPL 544 deliberately swerved in front of two others in order to get a preferred position at a stop light. When one driver, who had barely missed crashing into a parked vehicle in order to avoid 544, protested, the so-called diplomat sneered and waved his hand in derision. Then, as if to show his regard for American law, he thrust his car forward before the light changed to green, disappearing into traffic and free to aggravate and laugh at other law-abiding natives.

Through official channels, it was learned that DPL 544 had been issued to one Abdelhadi Al Hamandi, whose car was registered at the United Arab Republic Embassy, 2435 California Street NW. Now, Mr. Speaker, it might be assumed that an embassy involved in such an incident would be eager to apologize for the conduct of the responsible employee, but a number of calls to the United Arab Republic office failed to bring a satisfactory reply. An embassy spokesman denied that Abdelhadi Al Hamandi was connected with the embassy, then promised to investigate further. No explanation was ever forthcoming.

The naive Pennsylvanian's first reaction to the driving infraction was to report it to the police, but, as any old timer around Washington, knows, the area could have been surrounded by squad cars and still the police would have been helpless to take effective action.

District of Columbia police do not have to look to New York City to find out what happens to officers who expect foreign diplomats to obey American laws. Their firm precedent was established on March 17, 1956, when a patrolman in Washington made the mistake of ticketing a double-parked DPL car. When the driver, a second secretary on an embassy staff, protested, a scuffle ensued and the officer was found guilty of "wrongfully and without authority arresting" a member of the diplomatic corps. He was fined \$75 for his conscientious effort to enforce the law.

Any further doubt of the helplessness of American officers of the law when dealing with foreign diplomats evaporated in a series of incidents that began with the arrest of an Ambassador's son on May 26, 1957, after he became involved in a scuffle with a policeman who remonstrated against the boy's drinking beer in public and in direct violation of District law. The offender claimed diplomatic immunity and was released.

A year later, on April 30, the same young man drank beer as he walked along Wisconsin Avenue at 1 a.m., then threw

the mug to the sidewalk and used abusive language when an officer appeared. He was again released because of diplomatic immunity.

March 1, 1959: Trouble in a tavern, with the Ambassador's son finally swinging at a policeman. Again released on the same excuse.

October 10, 1959: When an officer responded to trouble in a restaurant, the same offender became loud and bolsterous, touching off a melee that resulted in the officer's being kicked and knocked down by the foreigner and his gang. Released as usual.

Mr. Speaker, how many countries would permit this sort of disregard for their law on the part of an American citizen regardless of his official position? And how far must an American police officer tolerate and concede in the face of hostile challenges by immunized aliens?

The final episode of this particular case took place 1 month after the man's last brawl with the police. He drove a car that struck and killed a woman who was knocked 41 feet by the impact. A coroner's inquest into the accident was canceled on the advice of the U.S. attorney because it had no jurisdiction over the driver. At long last the offender—now 21 years of age—was sent home to his native land by the ambassador, his father.

Fortunately, incidents of such serious consequences are highly infrequent, although there appear to be no means or methods available to prevent or to deal with them. Several years ago a diplomat attacked a New York subway inspector and threatened him with a gun, then won quick release at a police station after pleading diplomatic immunity.

Whatever the answer to the perennial problems created by diplomatic immunity, the first premise would seem to be the need for teaching foreigners—regardless of their diplomatic status—to respect the American police officer. Next, greater effort must be directed at dissuading DPL drivers from flaunting traffic regulations.

A key to the difficulty may lie in the statute which protects diplomats from arrest. It was enacted in 1790, a century before the advent of the automobile, and may very well be in need of renovating or updating. Since it came into being, a progressively greater number of diplomats and their entourages have descended upon Washington. In 1962 a local newspaper estimated the number of diplomats in Washington immune from arrest at more than 6,000, and there is no reason to believe that there are fewer here today.

Surely it is not necessary to grant diplomatic immunity to so many ambassadors, their staffs, employees, and servants. I would hope that the State Department could work out an arrangement whereby only top echelon personnel are granted the immunity privilege.

Meanwhile, Mr. Speaker, I propose that the name of the country of ownership be printed in large letters on every DPL license plate issued in the District of Columbia. I believe that as a consequence all ambassadors and their principal staff members, recognizing the good will that can be gained or lost when the

identity of a vehicle's ownership is exposed to citizens of this country, would be much more explicit in their instructions to employees. At least the new license plates would give Americans an opportunity to find out just what countries are and which are not respectful of our laws.

I am today introducing a bill which directs District of Columbia officials to have the name of the country imprinted on each diplomatic license plate.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S BRAVE DECISION TO BOMB NORTH VIETNAM SUPPORTED BY STATE DEPARTMENT WHITE PAPER ON COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

(Mr. PUCINSKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, last weekend the State Department issued its brilliantly documented "white paper" describing in exhaustive detail North Vietnam's campaign to conquer South Vietnam.

In the preamble to this historic document, the following excerpt delivered by President Lyndon B. Johnson on February 17, 1965, is quoted:

Our purpose in Vietnam is to join in the defense and protection of freedom of a brave people who are under attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their country.

This excerpt from President Johnson's remarks clearly indicates America's determination to halt the agonizing chain of Communist aggression since World War II.

Americans, and indeed those dedicated to the principles of human dignity throughout the world, can all find comfort and strength in the knowledge that President Johnson has given American foreign policy a new and decisive direction.

There are those who today would criticize President Johnson, but fortunately they constitute only a minuscule segment of the American population.

It becomes crystal clear, as new developments occur in Vietnam, that neither the New York Times nor the columnists are setting foreign policy for the United States. Indeed, foreign policy is now being determined, as our Constitution provides, by the President of the United States, and Mr. Johnson alone has shown the courage to deal with the Communists from a position of strength, yet preserving, for the entire world to see, our genuine desire not to extend hostilities in Vietnam any more than is absolutely necessary. Mr. Johnson has now put the burden on the Communists to decide if they want escalation. For the first time since World War II, it is the Communists who are forced to respond to our initiative; our determination; our policy.

By his bold and heroic action, President Johnson has already written a new and glorious page in American history. I am confident that the President's determination to deal forcefully with Communist aggression in South Vietnam by striking at the very heart of North Vietnam's staging areas for their in-

famous subversion, will prove to be the bold decision which will avoid world war III.

President Johnson has repeatedly assured the entire world, including the Communists, that our Nation wants peace and the security of freedom for our allies.

President Johnson has stated repeatedly that our Nation wants to avoid escalation in Vietnam.

There are those who have asked why the raids on North Vietnam at this particular time when Communist leaders are holding their summit meeting. There are others who seriously challenge President Johnson's determination to bomb the Communist's staging areas and say that such attacks will solidify the Communist world.

Yet others, Mr. Speaker, bluntly state that Mr. Johnson's timing is wrong and that American attacks on Communist staging areas in North Vietnam should have been held up, at least until after the Communists' summit meeting.

Certainly, I would not be one to deny others their views, but I suggest, Mr. Speaker, that President Johnson's critics are unable to see the forest for the trees.

History will prove President Johnson an unparalleled tactician. It is my judgment that President Johnson's decision to wage the attacks at this particular time is most timely, and has as its principal purpose a strong desire to avoid any miscalculations by the world Communist high command of our Nation's unwavering determination to support the cause of freedom in South Vietnam.

It is my humble judgment that to avoid air retaliations at this time would have been an open invitation for massive Communist aggression in South Vietnam and perhaps other troubled spots throughout the world.

Admittedly, President Johnson is taking a bold calculation. But it is a brave calculation and the American people owe their President eternal gratitude that he has not been dissuaded by such highly influential opinion movers as the New York Times in his final judgment.

Mr. Johnson has clearly told the Communists they must be prepared to suffer the full consequences of their continued aggression. He has spoken in a language unmistakably clear. The next move is up to Hanoi and its Communist allies.

The weight of President Johnson's responsibility is awesome, and he deserves the prayers of all Americans for continued strength to chart a victorious course through these very troubled times.

But above all, Mr. Speaker, it would be my hope that those who have been so quick to criticize the President would pause during this great crisis and reflect for a moment on how difficult is the task of an American President.

It is easy enough for the columnists and the editorial writers to second-guess the President. If they are wrong, few people ever remember.

Only the President of the United States cannot afford to be wrong, because, indeed, the survival of civilization rests on his judgment.

It is for this reason that all Americans can take pride in the bold decision made

by President Johnson to launch the air strikes against the Communists in North Vietnam.

One has a right to ask: "How many other Americans would have had the courage to make the final decisions which Mr. Johnson has had to make during the past few weeks?"

I am confident that time will prove President Johnson right. Certainly, Mr. Speaker, reading the white paper on aggression by the Communists from North Vietnam, clearly and unmistakably shows how justified President Johnson is in setting the bold, albeit precarious, course that he has set for our actions in Vietnam.

It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I should like to include with my remarks today the State Department's "white paper" in its entirety.

This is one of the most significant documents ever prepared by the American State Department. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and his entire staff deserve the highest commendation for putting this entire matter into its proper perspective.

Any fair-minded person, regardless of his political beliefs, cannot help but realize that for President Johnson to have ordered any other course in the face of the overwhelming evidence contained in this white paper, would have been to write perhaps the final chapter in freedom's retreat to Communist infamy.

It is my hope that every American will pause in his busy schedule long enough to read the State Department's white paper. I am confident, Mr. Speaker, that only then could this Nation fully understand the tremendous service President Johnson is rendering the American people and the cause of freedom throughout the world.

Mr. Speaker, the State Department white paper follows. I only regret that under the rules of the House, I am unable to reprint at this time the tremendously persuasive pictorial exhibits which were published as part of the State Department's indictment against the Communists of North Vietnam.

AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH—THE RECORD OF NORTH VIETNAM'S CAMPAIGN TO CONQUER SOUTH VIETNAM

"Our purpose in Vietnam is to join in the defense and protection of freedom of a brave people who are under attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their country." (President Lyndon B. Johnson, February 17, 1965.)

INTRODUCTION

South Vietnam is fighting for its life against a brutal campaign of terror and armed attack inspired, directed, supplied, and controlled by the Communist regime in Hanoi. This flagrant aggression has been going on for years, but recently the pace has quickened and the threat has now become acute.

The war in Vietnam is a new kind of war, a fact as yet poorly understood in most parts of the world. Much of the confusion that prevails in the thinking of many people, and even many governments, stems from this basic misunderstanding. For in Vietnam a totally new brand of aggression has been loosed against an independent people who want to make their own way in peace and freedom.

Vietnam is not another Greece, where indigenous guerrilla forces used friendly neighboring territory as a sanctuary.

Vietnam is not another Malaya, where Communist guerrillas were, for the most part, physically distinguishable from the peaceful majority they sought to control.

Vietnam is not another Philippines, where Communist guerrillas were physically separated from the source of their moral and physical support.

Above all, the war in Vietnam is not a spontaneous and local rebellion against the established government.

There are elements in the Communist program of conquest directed against South Vietnam common to each of the previous areas of aggression and subversion. But there is one fundamental difference. In Vietnam a Communist government has set out deliberately to conquer a sovereign people in a neighboring state. And to achieve its end, it has used every resource of its own government to carry out its carefully planned program of concealed aggression. North Vietnam's commitment to seize control of the South is no less total than was the commitment of the regime in North Korea in 1950. But knowing the consequences of the latter's undisguised attack, the planners in Hanoi have tried desperately to conceal their hand. They have failed and their aggression is as real as that of an invading army.

This report is a summary of the massive evidence of North Vietnamese aggression obtained by the Government of South Vietnam. This evidence has been jointly analyzed by South Vietnamese and American experts.

The evidence shows that the hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Vietnam were trained in the north and ordered into the south by Hanoi. It shows that the key leadership of the Vietcong (VC), the officers and much of the cadre, many of the technicians, political organizers, and propagandists have come from the north and operate under Hanoi's direction. It shows that the training of essential military personnel and their infiltration into the south is directed by the military high command in Hanoi. (See sec. I.)

The evidence shows that many of the weapons and much of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Vietcong have been sent into South Vietnam from Hanoi. In recent months new types of weapons have been introduced in the VC army, for which all ammunition must come from outside sources. Communist China and other Communist States have been the prime suppliers of these weapons and ammunition, and they have been channeled primarily through North Vietnam. (See sec. II.)

The directing force behind the effort to conquer South Vietnam is the Communist Party in the north, the Lao Dong (Workers) Party. As in every Communist State, the party is an integral part of the regime itself. North Vietnamese officials have expressed their firm determination to absorb South Vietnam into the Communist world. (See sec. III.)

Through its central committee, which controls the government of the north, the Lao Dong Party directs the total political and military effort of the Vietcong. The military high command in the north trains the military men and sends them into South Vietnam. The Central Research Agency, North Vietnam's central intelligence organization, directs the elaborate espionage and subversion effort. The extensive political-military organization in the north which directs the Vietcong war effort is described in section IV.

Under Hanoi's overall direction the Communists have established an extensive machine for carrying on the war within South Vietnam. The focal point is the Central Office for South Vietnam with its political and military subsections and other specialized agencies. A subordinate part of this Central Office is the Liberation Front for South Vietnam. The front was formed at

Hanoi's order in 1960. Its principal function is to influence opinion abroad and to create the false impression that the aggression in South Vietnam is an indigenous rebellion against the established government. (See sec. IV.)

For more than 10 years the people and the Government of South Vietnam, exercising the inherent right of self-defense, have fought back against these efforts to extend Communist power south across the 17th parallel. The United States has responded to the appeals of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam for help in this defense of the freedom and independence of its land and its people.

In 1961 the Department of State issued a report called "A Threat to the Peace." It described North Vietnam's program to seize South Vietnam. The evidence in that report had been presented by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to the International Control Commission (ICC). A special report by the ICC in June 1962 upheld the validity of that evidence. The Commission held that there was "sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt" that North Vietnam had sent arms and men into South Vietnam to carry out subversion with the aim of overthrowing the legal government there. The ICC found the authorities in Hanoi in specific violation of four provisions of the Geneva accords of 1954.¹

Since then, new and even more impressive evidence of Hanoi's aggression has accumulated. The Government of the United States believes that evidence should be presented to its own citizens and to the world. It is important for freemen to know what has been happening in Vietnam, and how, and why. That is the purpose of this report.

I. HANOI SUPPLIES THE KEY PERSONNEL FOR THE ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM

The hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Vietnam are men trained in North Vietnam. They are ordered into the south and remain under the military discipline of the military high command in Hanoi. Special training camps operated by the North Vietnamese Army gave political and military training to the infiltrators. Increasingly the forces sent into the south are native North Vietnamese who have never seen South Vietnam. A special infiltration unit, the 70th Transportation Group, is responsible for moving men from North Vietnam into the south via infiltration trails through Laos. Another special unit, the maritime infiltration group, sends weapons and supplies and agents by sea into the south.

The infiltration rate has been increasing. From 1959 to 1960, when Hanoi was establishing its infiltration pipeline, at least 1,800 men, and possibly 2,700 more, moved into South Vietnam from the north. The flow increased to a minimum of 3,700 in 1961 and at least 5,400 in 1962. There was a modest decrease in 1963 to 4,200 confirmed infiltrators, though later evidence is likely to raise this figure.

For 1964 the evidence is still incomplete. However, it already shows that a minimum of 4,400 infiltrators entered the south, and it is estimated more than 3,000 others were sent in.

There is usually a time lag between the entry of infiltrating troops and the discovery of clear evidence they have entered. This fact, plus collateral evidence of increased use of the infiltration routes, suggests strongly that 1964 was probably the year of greatest infiltration so far.

Thus, since 1959, nearly 20,000 VC officers, soldiers, and technicians are known to have entered South Vietnam under orders from Hanoi. Additional information indicates that an estimated 17,000 more infiltrators were dispatched to the south by the regime in Hanoi during the past 6 years. It can reasonably be assumed that still other infil-

tration groups have entered the south for which there is no evidence yet available.

To some the level of infiltration from the north may seem modest in comparison with the total size of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. But one-for-one calculations are totally misleading in the kind of warfare going on in Vietnam. First, a high proportion of infiltrators from the north are well-trained officers, cadres, and specialists. Second, it has long been realized that in guerrilla combat the burdens of defense are vastly heavier than those of attack. In Malaya, the Philippines, and elsewhere a ratio of at least 10 to 1 in favor of the forces of order was required to meet successfully the threat of the guerrillas' hit-and-run tactics.

In the calculus of guerrilla warfare the scale of North Vietnamese infiltration into the south takes on a very different meaning. For the infiltration of 5,000 guerrilla fighters in a given year is the equivalent of marching perhaps 50,000 regular troops across the border, in terms of the burden placed on the defenders.

Above all, the number of proved and probable infiltrators from the north should be seen in relation to the size of the VC forces. It is now estimated that the Vietcong number approximately 35,000 so-called hard-core forces, and another 60,000 to 80,000 local forces. It is thus apparent that infiltrators from the north—allowing for casualties—make up the majority of the so-called hard-core Vietcong. Personnel from the north, in short, are now and have always been the backbone of the entire VC operation.

It is true that many of the lower level elements of the VC forces are recruited within South Vietnam. However, the thousands of reported cases of VC kidnappings and terrorism make it abundantly clear that the threats and other pressures by the Vietcong play a major part in such recruitment.

A. The infiltration process

The infiltration routes supply hard-core units with most of their officers and non-commissioned personnel. This source helps fill the gaps left by battle casualties, illness, and defection and insures continued control by Hanoi. Also, as the nature of the conflict has changed, North Vietnam has supplied the Vietcong with technical specialists via the infiltration routes. These have included men trained in armor and ordnance, anti-aircraft, and communications as well as medical corpsmen and transport experts.

There is no single infiltration route from the north to South Vietnam. But by far the biggest percentage of infiltrators follow the same general course. The principal training center for North Vietnamese Army men assigned to join the Vietcong has been at Xuan Mai near Hanoi. Recently captured Vietcong have also reported an infiltration training camp at Thanh Hoa. After completion of their training course—which involves political and propaganda work as well as military subjects—infiltrating units are moved to Vinh on the east coast. Many have made stopovers at a staging area in Dong Hoi where additional training is conducted. From there they go by truck to the Laos border.

Then, usually after several days' rest, infiltrators move southward through Laos. Generally they move along the Laos-South Vietnam border. Responsibility for infiltration from North Vietnam through Laos belongs to the 70th Transportation Group of the North Vietnamese Army. After a time the infiltration groups turn eastward, entering South Vietnam in Quang Nam, Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Kontum, or another of the border provinces.

The Communists have established regular lanes for infiltration with way stations established about 1 day's march apart. The way stations are equipped to quarter and feed the Vietcong passing through. Infiltrators who suffer from malaria or other illnesses stay at the stations until they recover

sufficiently to join another passing group moving south.

The map on page 4 [not shown in Record] shows the infiltration route from North Vietnam to the south followed by VC Sgt. Huynh Van Tay and a group of North Vietnamese Army officers and men in September 1963. Tay was captured during an engagement in Chuong Thien Province in April 1964.

Local guides lead the infiltration groups along the secret trails. Generally they direct the infiltrators from halfway between two stations, through their own base station, and on halfway to the next supply base. Thus the guides are kept in ignorance of all but their own way stations. Only group leaders are permitted to talk with the guides in order to preserve maximum security. The men are discouraged from asking where they are or where they are going.²

The same system of trails and guides used along the Lao infiltration routes is used within South Vietnam itself. Vietcong infiltrators may report directly to a reassignment center in the highlands as soon as they enter South Vietnam. But in the past year or more some groups have moved down trails in South Vietnam to provinces along the Cambodian border and near Saigon before receiving their unit assignment. Within South Vietnam infiltration and supplies are handled by VC units such as the Nam Son Transportation Group.

At the Laos border crossing point infiltrators are reequipped. Their North Vietnamese Army uniforms must be turned in. They must give up all personal papers, letters, notebooks, and photographs that might be incriminating. Document control over the infiltrators has been tightened considerably over the past 2 years. A number of Vietnamese infiltrators have told of being fitted out with Lao neutralist uniforms for their passage through Laos.

Infiltration groups are usually issued a set of black civilian pajama-like clothes, two unmarked uniforms, rubber sandals, a sweater, a hammock, mosquito netting, and waterproof sheeting. They carry a 3- to 5-day supply of food. A packet of medicines and bandages is usually provided.

The size of infiltration groups varies widely. Prisoners have mentioned units as small as 5 men and as large as 500. Generally the groups number 40 to 60. When they arrive in South Vietnam these groups are usually split up and assigned to various VC units as replacements, although some have remained intact.

B. Military personnel

The following are individual case histories of North Vietnamese soldiers sent by the Hanoi regime into South Vietnam. They are only an illustrative group. They show that the leadership and specialized personnel for the guerrilla war in South Vietnam consists in large part of members of the North Vietnamese armed forces, trained in the North and subject to the command and discipline of Hanoi.

1. Tran Quoc Dan

Dan was a VC major, commander of the 60th Battalion (sometimes known as the 34th Group of the Thon-Kim Battalion). Disillusioned with fighting his own countrymen and with communism and the lies of the Hanoi regime, he surrendered to the authorities in South Vietnam on February 11, 1963.

At the age of 15 he joined the revolutionary army (Vietminh) and fought against the French forces until 1954 when the Geneva accords ended the Indochina war. As a regular in the Vietminh forces, he was moved to North Vietnam. He became an officer in the so-called people's army.

In March 1962 Major Dan received orders to prepare to move to South Vietnam. He had been exposed to massive propaganda in the north which told of the destitution of the

²For additional maps of the routes taken by VC infiltrators into South Vietnam, see app. B.

¹For the text of pertinent sections of the ICC report, see app. A.

peasants in the south and said that the Americans had taken over the French role of colonialists. He said later that an important reason for his decision to surrender was that he discovered these propaganda themes were lies. He found the peasants more prosperous than the people in the north. And he recognized quickly that he was not fighting the Americans, but his own people.

With the 600 men of his unit, Major Dan left Hanoi on March 23, 1962. They traveled through the Laos corridor. His group joined up with the Vietcong 1st Regiment in central Vietnam.

The 35-year-old major took part in 45 actions and was wounded once in an unsuccessful VC attack on an outpost. As time passed he became increasingly discouraged by his experience as a VC troop commander. Most of all, he said, he was tired of killing other Vietnamese. After several months of soul-searching he decided to surrender to the authorities of the Republic of Vietnam. He has volunteered to do "anything to serve the national cause" of South Vietnam.

2. Vo Thoi

Sgt. Vo Thoi (Communist Party alias Vo Bien) was an assistant squad leader in the VC Tay Son 22d Battalion. On the night of October 7, 1963, his unit attacked An Tuong village in Binh Dinh Province. After overrunning the village, Vo's company was assigned to set up an ambush against Republic of Vietnam troops rushing to defend the village. In the ensuing fight Vo was seriously wounded. He was picked up by local farmers and turned over to the authorities.

Vo's life and experiences were similar to those of thousands of Vietcong. Born in Quang Ngai Province in 1932, he went through 5 years of school and then worked on his parents' small farm. During the war against the French he joined the Viet Minh forces. When the fighting ended, he was transferred to North Vietnam with his unit, the 210th Regiment. He remained in the North Vietnamese Army until 1960 when he was sent to work on a state farm in Nghe An Province. Vo said 3,000 men and women worked on the farm, of whom 400 were soldiers. In September 1962 Vo was told he must join the newly activated 22d Battalion. All members of the battalion came from provinces in South Vietnam, from Quang Tri to Phu Yen. But it was not an ordinary battalion; two-thirds of its members were cadre with ranks up to senior captain.

The group was put through an advanced training course that lasted 6 months. The training program included combat tactics for units from squad to company and the techniques of guerrilla and counter guerrilla fighting. There were heavy doses of political indoctrination.

On March 5, 1963, the 22d Battalion received orders to move south. They were transported in trucks from Nghe An Province to Dong Hoi in Quang Binh, just north of the 17th parallel. From there the unit was moved westward to the Lao border. Then the more than 300 men began walking to the south following mountain trails in Laos and the Vietnam border area. They marched by day, rested at night. Every fifth day they stopped at a way station for a full day's rest. One company dropped off at Thua Thien Province. Vo and the remainder of the group marched on to Pleiku Province. Two fully armed companies from a neighboring province were assigned to the battalion. The assignment given to the battalion was to harass strategic hamlets in the Hoai An district of Binh Dinh, to round up cattle and rice, to kill or kidnap cadre of the Government forces, and to recruit local youth for service with the Vietcong.

3. Nguyen Thao

Nguyen Thao was a VC weapons technician. A native of Khanh Hao Province in South Vietnam, he joined the Vietminh in 1950. He worked at a secret arsenal manufacturing weapons for use by the guerrilla

forces. He went to North Vietnam after the Geneva accords were signed in 1954. In North Vietnam he attended a technical school specializing in arms and manufacture. He received special training in foreign small arms and artillery.

At the end of 1962 he was ordered to Ha Dong to attend a special course of political training in preparation for infiltrating into South Vietnam. On completion of the training course he was assigned to a group of 14 men who would move to the south together. Nguyen Thao said the group was composed of four armament specialists, two chemical engineers, and eight middle-level technical cadre.

They left Ha Dong in March 1963, crossed into Laos, and reached their destination in the northern part of South Vietnam in May. Nguyen Thao went to work at a secret VC arsenal near the Quang Ngai border. Fifty men, some local workers, manned the arsenal weapons section. The group manufactured mines and grenades for the VC units in the area and repaired weapons.

Nguyen Thao said he soon realized from talking with the local workers at the arsenal that most of what he had heard in the North about conditions in South Vietnam was wrong. He said the Communists had deceived him. Two months after his arrival at the arsenal he decided to defect. He asked permission to rejoin his family and to work in a national defense factory and continue his studies.

4. Nguyen Viet Le

This VC soldier was born in Quang Nam Province in South Vietnam. He served with the 305th Division of the Viet Minh and moved to North Vietnam in 1954. In April 1961, Nguyen Viet Le and his unit, the 50th Battalion, moved into Laos. He said the unit remained in Laos for 2 months, during which it fought in four battles alongside the Pathet Lao. During these engagements one of the battalion's four companies was badly mauled and had to be returned to North Vietnam.

The other three companies were assigned to South Vietnam. They arrived in Quang Ngai Province in the summer of 1961. For a month they rested and waited for orders. They took part in a major action against an outpost of the Government of South Vietnam in September. Nguyen Viet Le was captured during a battle in Quang Ngai Province in April 1962.

5. Nguyen Truc

Corp. Nguyen Truc was born in 1933, the son of a farmer in Phu Yen Province in South Vietnam. From 1949 to 1954 he served as a courier and then as a guerrilla fighter with the Viet Minh. In early 1955 he boarded a Soviet ship and moved with his unit, the 40th Battalion, to North Vietnam. He remained in the army, but in 1959, bothered by illness, he went to work on a state farm.

In August 1962 Nguyen Truc was notified that he was back in the army and that he was being sent to South Vietnam. He reported to the Xuan Mai training center and underwent 6 months of military and political re-education. His unit was the newly activated 22d Battalion. The training course was completed in February 1963, but departure for South Vietnam was delayed until April.

For infiltration purposes the battalion was divided into two groups. On April 27, Nguyen Truc and his group boarded trucks at Xuan Mai. They went first to Vinh, then on to Dong Hoi, and finally to the Laos-North Vietnam border. There they doffed their North Vietnamese army uniforms and put on black peasants' clothing. The march to the south began, sometimes in Lao territory, sometimes in Vietnam. They passed through Thua Thien Province, then Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai, and finally to their destination, Pleiku. Each day they had a new guide, generally one of the mountain people of the area.

Nguyen said that he and most of the

troops who were sent north after the Indochina war wanted to return to their homes and rejoin their families. In August 1963, Nguyen Truc was sent out on a foraging expedition to find food for his unit. He took the opportunity to defect to Government forces at An Tuc in Binh Dinh Province.

6. Nguyen Cam

Cam is the son of a farmer in Quang Tin Province. Born in 1929, he joined the Vietminh youth group in his home village in 1946. In 1 year he became a guerrilla fighter. In 1954, as the Indochina war was drawing to a close, he was serving with the Vietminh 20th Battalion. In May 1955 he went to North Vietnam with his unit.

Ill health caused his transfer to an agricultural camp in 1958. By 1960 he was back in uniform, serving in the 210th Regiment. In May of that year he was assigned to a small group that was to set up a metallurgical workshop. Early in 1961 he was sent to a metallurgical class in Nghe An Province. They were taught a simple form of cast iron production, simple blast furnace construction, and similar skills. Their instructor was an engineer from the Hanoi industrial department.

Their special course completed, Cam and his group of 35 men prepared to go to South Vietnam. They went by truck from their training center at Nghe An to the Lao border. After 19 days marching through Laos, they arrived in the vicinity of Tchepone. There they waited for 3 days until food supplies could be airdropped by a North Vietnamese plane. Nineteen days of walking took them to the Laos-South Vietnam border.

Delayed en route by illness, Cam finally reached his destination in November 1961. It was a secret VC iron foundry in Kontum Province. Several iron ore deposits were nearby, and the hill people had long used the iron to make knives and simple tools. Cam's job was building kilns to smelt the ore. The Vietcong hoped to use the iron for mines and grenades.

On August 4, 1963, Sergeant Cam went to a nearby village to buy salt for his group. On his return he found his comrades had gone to one of their cultivated fields to gather corn, and he joined them. The group was interrupted at their work by a Vietnamese ranger company. After a brief fight Cam was taken prisoner.

7. Nguyen Hong Thai

Thai, 32 years old, was born and grew up in Quang Nkai Province in South Vietnam. After service with the Vietminh he was moved to North Vietnam in 1954. After 3 years of military service he was assigned to a military farm. In December 1961 he was recalled to his former unit, the 305th Division, and went to the special training camp at Xuan Mai in preparation for fighting with the Vietcong in South Vietnam.

Training began in January 1962 and lasted for 4 months. The training group, designated the 32d Battalion, was composed of 650 men who came from various branches of the North Vietnamese Army—engineers, artillery, airborne, transport, marines, and some factory workers and students. Three-fourths of the training was military (guerrilla tactics, ambushes, sabotage, etc.) and one-fourth was political. In the latter, heavy emphasis was laid on the necessity for armed seizure of power in the south.

Group 32 was divided into sections and began infiltrating to the south on July 14, 1962. It moved in three groups. Thai said it took his group more than 55 days to travel from North Vietnam through Laos to Quang Ngai Province in the south. He reported that all the communications and liaison stations on the route to South Vietnam are now operated by the Army of North Vietnam. Soon after his arrival in South Vietnam, Thai was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. He was made a platoon leader in the 20th Vietcong Highland Battalion. In February 1963 the

unit moved from Quang Nam to Kontum Province.

Combat conditions and the rigors of guerrilla life began to depress Thai. He said he wanted only to rejoin his family and live in peace. In September he asked and received permission to visit his family in Quang Ngai. When he got home, he surrendered to a South Vietnamese Army post.

8. Dao Kien Lap

Lap is a civilian radio technician. He has been a member of the Communist Party in North Vietnam since 1955. In February 1963 he was selected for assignment to South Vietnam where he was to work with the Liberation Front. He infiltrated into South Vietnam with a group of about 70 civilian specialists. They included doctors, pharmacists, union organizers, radio specialists, propagandists, and youth organizers. One of the infiltrators in Dao's group was a man named Binh, publisher of the newspaper Labor of the Lao Dong Party. Another was a member of the city soviet of Hanoi.

The specialists in Dao's group received 3 months of basic military training at Son Tay, and then departed for the south in mid-June. Their orders were to report to the central office of the Vietcong in South Vietnam where they would be assigned according to their individual specialties. Dao and Binh were to help run a radio station of the Liberation Front.

They traveled through Laos and along the Vietnam border. They had to stop for several weeks in Quang Nam Province to recuperate from their travels. On October 1 they were directed by guides to a VC station in Ban Me Thuot.

Dao said he had by then decided to defect to the government authorities in the south. He set off with one companion, but they were separated as they crossed a swiftly flowing river. Dao gave himself up at a government post in Ban Me Thuot on October 13, 1963.

9. Tran Ngoc Linh

Linh was a Vietcong senior sergeant, leader of a reconnaissance platoon. He is the son of a middle-class farm family in Tay Ninh Province. He served with the Viet Minh against the French and moved to North Vietnam in 1954. He spent the next 7 years in the North Vietnamese Army. In September 1962 Linh was assigned to the Xuan Mai training center at Ha Dong to prepare for duty in South Vietnam. His group was given a 4-month refresher course in infantry tactics with emphasis on guerrilla fighting. Then he received 6 months of special training in the use of machineguns against aircraft. Antiaircraft training has become an increasingly important part of the preparation of North Vietnamese troops assigned to the Vietcong.

Linh and about 120 others made up the 406th Infiltration Group commander by Senior Capt. Nguyen Van Do. They were divided into four platoons. During the final 2 weeks of preparation each member of the group was issued new equipment—black, pajama-like uniforms, a khaki uniform, a hammock, mosquito netting, rubber sandals, and other supplies, including two packets of medicine.

In the early morning hours of July 4, 1963, his group started its journey from the Xuan Mai training center outside Hanoi. The convey of six Molotov trucks moved south along Highway 21 to Nghe An Province and then on to Quang Binh. On July 7 they arrived at the final processing station near the Laos-North Vietnam border. There they turned in their North Vietnamese Army uniforms as well as all personal papers and anything else that might identify them as coming from the north. But their departure for the south was delayed for several weeks. In August they set off through Laos.

Twice along the way Linh had to stop at liaison stations because of illness. When the infiltrators recovered from their illnesses,

they were formed into special groups to continue their penetration into South Vietnam. Linh reported being delayed once for 8 days, and the second time for 10 days.

Finally, in the first week of November 1963, Linh was sufficiently recovered to begin the final leg of his journey to a VC center where he was to be assigned to a combat unit. He and three others who had been similarly delayed by attacks of malaria and other sickness made up a group. They moved through the jungles of Quang Duc Province near the Cambodian border. On the morning of November 9 they crossed the Srepok River. There they ran into a unit of the South Vietnamese Army. One of the infiltrators was killed, Linh was taken prisoner, and the other two Vietcong escaped.

These are typical Vietcong. There are many other officers like Tran Quoc Dan, technicians like Nguyen Thao, and simple soldiers like Nguyen Truc. They were born in South Vietnam, fought against the French, and then went north and served in the army of North Vietnam. They were ordered by the Communist rulers in Hanoi to reenter South Vietnam. Violating the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, they used the territory of neighboring Laos to infiltrate into the South. They are the means by which Communist North Vietnam is carrying out its program of conquest in South Vietnam.³

C. Infiltration of native North Vietnamese

The Communist authorities in Hanoi are now assigning native North Vietnamese in increasing numbers to join the VC forces in South Vietnam. Heretofore, those in charge of the infiltration effort has sought to fill their quotas with soldiers and others born in the south. The 90,000 troops that moved from South Vietnam to the north when the Geneva accords ended the Indochina War have provided an invaluable reservoir for this purpose. Now, apparently, that source is running dry. The casualty rate has been high, and obviously many of those who were in fighting trim 10 years ago are no longer up to the rigors of guerrilla war.

In any case, reports of infiltration by native North Vietnamese in significant numbers have been received in Saigon for several months. It is estimated that as many as 75 percent of the more than 4,400 Vietcong who are known to have entered the south in the first 8 months of 1964 were natives of North Vietnam.

Vo Thanh Vinh was born in Nghe An Province in North Vietnam in 1936. He was captured by South Vietnamese forces on May 5, 1964. He described himself as a military security officer. He infiltrated into South Vietnam in April 1964 with a group of 34 police and security officers from the north.

Another native North Vietnamese captured in the south was VC Pfc. Vo Quyen. His home was in Nam Dinh Province. He was a member of the 2d Battalion of the North Vietnamese Army's 9th Regiment. He said the entire battalion had infiltrated into South Vietnam between February and May last year. He was captured in an action in Quang Tri Province on July 4. He told interrogators that the bulk of his unit was composed of young draftees from North Vietnam.

Le Pham Hung, also a private, first class, was captured on July 7 in Thua Thien Province. He is a native of Nam Dinh in North Vietnam. Drafted for military service in May 1963, he was in the 324th Division. His group, consisting solely of 90 North Vietnamese draftees, infiltrated into South Vietnam in May 1964. He reported that another company of the North Vietnamese entered the south at the same time as his unit.

A former member of the 90th VC Battal-

ion reported that his unit had been reinforced by native North Vietnamese troops earlier this year. Le Thua Phuong, an information cadre and a native of Quang Ngai Province in the south, surrendered to Government forces on April 23, 1964. He said that the 90th Battalion had received 80 North Vietnamese replacements in February.

A medical technician named Hoang Thung was captured in Thuan Thien Province on July 4, 1964. He said he had infiltrated into the south in late 1963 with a group of 200 Vietcong, the majority of whom were ethnic northerners, 120 of them draftees.

These reports destroy one more fiction which the authorities in Hanoi have sought so long to promote—that the fighting in the south was a matter for the South Vietnamese. They underline Hanoi's determination to press its campaign of conquest with every available resource.

D. Infiltration of Vietcong agents

No effort to subvert another nation as elaborate as that being conducted by the Ho Chi Minh regime against South Vietnam can succeed without an intelligence-gathering organization. Recognizing this, the authorities in Hanoi have developed an extensive espionage effort. An essential part of that effort is the regular assignment of secret agents from the north to South Vietnam.

The heart of the VC intelligence organization is the Central Research Agency in Hanoi. (See sec. IV, C.) Communist agents are regularly dispatched from North Vietnam, sometimes for brief assignments but often for long periods. Many of these agents move into South Vietnam along the infiltration trails through Laos; others are carried by boats along the coasts and landed at prearranged sites. A special maritime infiltration group has been developed in North Vietnam, with its operations centered in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh Provinces just north of the 17th parallel.

1. Maritime Infiltration

The following case illustrates the methods of maritime infiltration of secret agents used by the Communist regime of North Vietnam.

In July 1962 a North Vietnamese intelligence agent named Nguyen Viet Duong began training to infiltrate South Vietnam. A native southerner, he had fought against the French and had gone to North Vietnam after the war ended. Selected for intelligence work, he was assigned to the Central Research Agency in 1959.

After a period of intensive instruction in radio transmission, coding and decoding, and other skills of the intelligence trade, he was given false identity papers and other supplies and was transported to the south. His principal task was to set up a cell of agents to collect military information. He flew from Hanoi to Dong Hoi, and from there the Maritime infiltration group took him by boat to South Vietnam. That was in August 1962.

In January 1963 Duong reported to Hanoi that he had run into difficulties. His money and papers had been lost, and he had been forced to take refuge with VC contacts in another province. Another agent was selected to go to South Vietnam. One of his assignments was to contact Duong, find out details of what happened to him, and help Duong reestablish himself as a VC agent. The man selected for the task was Senior Captain Tran Van Tan of the Central Research Agency.

Tan had already been picked to go to the South to establish a clandestine VC communications center. Making contact with Duong was one of his secondary assignment. After intensive preparations Tan was ready to move to South Vietnam in March. He was transferred to an embarkation base of the maritime infiltration group just north of the 17th parallel.

³ See app. C for additional details on military infiltrators.

He was joined by three other VC agents and the captain and three crewmen of the boat that would take them south. All were given false identity papers to conform to their false names. They also were provided with fishermen's permits, South Vietnamese voting cards, and draft cards or military discharge papers. The boat captain received a boat registration book, crew lists, and several South Vietnamese permits to conduct business.

The agents and boatmen were given cover stories to tell if captured. Each man had to memorize not only the details of his own story but the names and some details about each of the others. The agents had to become familiar with simple boat procedures so they could pass as legitimate fishermen.

The expedition left the embarkation port on April 4. In addition to the four agents the boat carried six carefully sealed boxes containing a generator, several radios, some weapons, and a large supply of South Vietnamese currency. They also carried some chemicals and materials for making false identification papers. Their destination was a landing site on the coast of Phuoc Tuy Province.

Soon after leaving North Vietnam the VC boat encountered high winds and rough seas. On April 7 the storm became violent. The boat tossed and threatened to capsize. Strong northeasterly winds forced it ever closer to shore. Finally the boat captain, Nguyen Xit, ordered that the six boxes be thrown overboard. This was done, and the boat then was beached. The eight men decided to split up into pairs and try to make contact with VC forces. They buried their false papers and set out. Six of the eight were captured almost immediately by authorities in Thua Thien Province, and the other two were taken several days later.

2. Student Propaganda Agents

The student population of South Vietnam is an important target group for VC propagandists. These agents seek to win adherents for the Communist cause among young workers, students in high schools and universities, and the younger officers and enlisted men in the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam.

Typical of the agents sent into South Vietnam for this purpose is Nguyen Van Vy, a 19-year-old VC propagandist. He is a native of the Vinh Linh District in North Vietnam, just north of the demilitarized zone. He was a member of a Communist Party youth group in his native village. He was recruited for propaganda work in the south in the fall of 1962. He was one of 40 young persons enrolled in a special political training course given by the Communist Party in his district.

The first phase of the training consisted of political indoctrination covering such subjects as the advance of communism, the North Vietnamese plan for winning control of the country, the responsibility of youth in furthering this plan, the war in the south, and the need for propaganda supporting the Liberation Front.

Those who successfully completed the first phase were selected for the second level of training, the so-called technical training phase. In this the trainees were given their mission in the south. Vy was told he should infiltrate into South Vietnam and there surrender to the authorities, describing himself as a defector who was "tired of the miserable life in the north." He was to say he wanted to complete his schooling, which was impossible in the north. He was told to ask to live with relatives in the south so he could go to school. Once his story was accepted and he was enrolled in a school, he was to begin his work of propagandizing other students. He was to wait for 3 or 4 months, however, until he was no longer the subject of local suspicion. He was assigned to work

under an older agent to whom he had to report regularly.

A third member of the team was a younger man who was to assist Vy. The three were to infiltrate into South Vietnam separately and to meet there at a rendezvous point.

At first Vy was to do no more than to observe his fellow students carefully, collecting biographical data on them and studying their personalities, capabilities, and aspirations. He was then to select those he thought might be most influenced by Communist propaganda and try to make friends with them.

Once he had selected targets, he was to begin to influence them favorably toward the north and to implant Communist propaganda. He was responsible then for bringing into his organization those he had influenced effectively. These individuals were to be given their own propaganda assignments to work on other students.

Students who wanted to evade military service in the Government forces were considered prime targets. Where possible, Vy was to help them get to North Vietnam. He was also told to make contact with any students who had been picked up by the authorities for suspected Communist activities. These, too, were to be helped to escape to North Vietnam. Any useful information concerning developments in the south or military activities were to be reported through his superior, Nguyen Van Phong.

In case he became suspect, he was either to make his own way back to North Vietnam or to go into the jungle and try to contact a VC unit.

Vy entered South Vietnam on January 2, 1963, by swimming across the Ben Hai River. He encountered an elderly farmer who led him to the local authorities in Hai Gu. There he told his story but it was not believed. He then admitted his true mission.

3. Other Agents

The Communist authorities in North Vietnam send their agents into South Vietnam by a wide variety of means. A few like Nguyen Van Vy cross the demilitarized zone, more infiltrate by sea, and still more along the infiltration routes through Laos. But there are other methods for entering South Vietnam. VC espionage agent Tran Van Bui attempted one such method.

Bui was a graduate of the espionage training school in Haiphong, North Vietnam. He completed a special 6-month course in July 1962. The training included political indoctrination, but most of the time was spent on such things as use of weapons, preparing booby traps, and methods of sabotage. He was also given instruction in methods for enlisting help from hoodlums, draft dodgers, and VC sympathizers. Once in South Vietnam, he was to organize a small unit for sabotage and the collection of information. On specific assignment by his superiors he was to be ready to sabotage ships in Saigon harbor and to blow up gasoline and oil storage points and Vietnamese Army installations. He was told to be prepared to assassinate Vietnamese officials and American personnel.

In September 1962 Bui was given his mission assignment. He was to hide aboard a foreign ship. When discovered, he was to claim to be a refugee who wanted to escape to South Vietnam. He was given an automatic pistol with silencer, some explosive devices, and a small knife that could inject poison into the body of a victim.

Bui stole aboard a foreign ship in Haiphong harbor. After 3 days at sea—when he was sure the ship would not turn around—Bui surrendered to the ship's captain. When the ship arrived in Bangkok, Bui was turned over to the Thai authorities. They in turn released him to the South Vietnamese as he had requested. But in Saigon his true mission was disclosed and he made a full confession.

II. HANOI SUPPLIES WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, AND OTHER WAR MATERIEL TO ITS FORCES IN THE SOUTH

When Hanoi launched the VC campaign of terror, violence, and subversion in earnest in 1959, the Communist forces relied mainly on stocks of weapons and ammunition left over from the war against the French. Supplies sent in from North Vietnam came largely from the same source. As the military campaign progressed, the Vietcong depended heavily on weapons captured from the Armed Forces in South Vietnam. This remains an important source of weapons and ammunitions for the Vietcong. But as the pace of the war has quickened, requirements for up-to-date arms and special types of weapons have risen to a point where the Vietcong cannot rely on captured stocks. Hanoi has undertaken a program to reequip its forces in the south with Communist-produced weapons.

Large and increasing quantities of military supplies are entering South Vietnam from outside the country. The principal supply point is North Vietnam, which provides a convenient channel for materiel that originates in Communist China and other Communist countries.

An increasing number of weapons from external Communist sources have been seized in the south. These include such weapons as 57-millimeter and 75-millimeter recoilless rifles, dual-purpose machineguns, rocket launchers, large mortars, and anti-tank mines.

A new group of Chinese Communist-manufactured weapons has recently appeared in VC hands. These include the 7.62 semiautomatic carbine, 7.62 light machinegun, and the 7.62 assault rifle. These weapons and ammunition for them, manufactured in Communist China in 1962, were first captured in December 1964 in Chuong Thien Province. Similar weapons have since been seized in each of the four corps areas of South Vietnam. Also captured have been Chinese Communist antitank grenade launchers and ammunition made in China in 1963.

One captured Vietcong told his captors that his entire company had been supplied recently with modern Chinese weapons. The reequipping of VC units with a type of weapons that require ammunition and parts from outside South Vietnam indicates the growing confidence of the authorities in Hanoi in the effectiveness of their supply lines into the south.

Incontrovertible evidence of Hanoi's elaborate program to supply its forces in the south with weapons, ammunition, and other supplies has accumulated over the years. Dramatic new proof was exposed just as this report was being completed.

On February 16, 1965, an American helicopter pilot flying along the South Vietnamese coast sighted a suspicious vessel. It was a cargo ship of an estimated 100-ton capacity, carefully camouflaged and moored just offshore along the coast of Phu Yen Province. Fighter planes that approached the vessel met machinegun fire from guns on the deck of the ship and from the shore as well. A Vietnamese Air Force strike was launched against the vessel, and Vietnamese Government troops moved into the area. They seized the ship after a bitter fight with the Vietcong.

The ship, which had been sunk in shallow water, had discharged a huge cargo of arms, ammunition, and other supplies. Documents found on the ship and on the bodies of several Vietcong aboard identified the vessel as having come from North Vietnam. A newspaper in the cabin was from Haiphong and was dated January 23, 1965. The supplies delivered by the ship—thousands of weapons and more than a million rounds of ammunition—were almost all of Communist origin, largely from Communist China and

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3941

Czechoslovakia, as well as North Vietnam. At least 100 tons of military supplies were discovered near the ship.

A preliminary survey of the cache near the sunken vessel from Hanoi listed the following supplies and weapons:

Approximately 1 million rounds of small-arms ammunition; more than 1,000 stick grenades; 500 pounds of TNT in prepared charges; 2,000 rounds of 82-millimeter mortar ammunition; 500 antitank grenades; 500 rounds of 57-millimeter recoilless rifle ammunition; more than 1,000 rounds of 75-millimeter recoilless rifle ammunition; one 57-millimeter recoilless rifle; 2 heavy machineguns; 2,000 7.95 Mauser rifles; more than 100, 7.62 carbines; 1,000 submachineguns; 15 light machineguns; 500 rifles; 500 pounds of medical supplies (with labels from North Vietnam, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Soviet Union, and other sources).

The ship was fairly new and had been made in Communist China. Documents aboard the ship included three North Vietnamese nautical charts (one of the Hai-phong area and one of Hong Gay, both in North Vietnam, and one of the Tra Vinh area of South Vietnam). The military health records of North Vietnamese soldiers were found. One man had a political history sheet showing he was a member of the 338th Division of the North Vietnamese Army. (See app. E.)

Also aboard the North Vietnamese ship were: an instruction book for a Chinese Communist navigational device; postcards and letters to addresses in North Vietnam; snapshots, including one of a group of men in North Vietnamese Army uniforms under a flag of the Hanoi government.

Members of the ICC and representatives of the free press visited the sunken North Vietnamese ship and viewed its cargo. The incident itself underlined in the most dramatic form that Hanoi is behind the continuing campaign of aggression aimed at conquering South Vietnam. It made unmistakably clear that what is happening in South Vietnam is not an internal affair but part of a large-scale carefully directed and supported program of armed attack on a sovereign state and a free people.

There have been previous seizures of large stocks of ammunition and weapons and other military supplies that could only have come from Communist sources outside South Vietnam. In December 1963, a Republic of Vietnam force attacked a VC stronghold in Dinh Tuong Province southwest of Saigon. A large cache of VC equipment was seized. Included in the captured stocks were the following weapons and ammunition, all of Chinese Communist manufacture:

One 90-millimeter rocket launcher; 2 carbines (type 53); 120 rounds of 75-millimeter recoilless rifle ammunition; 120 detonating fuses for recoilless rifle ammunition; 14,000 rounds of 7.62 (type P) ammunition; 160,000 rounds of 7.62 carbine ammunition; 150 fuses for mortar shells; 100,000 rounds of 7.92 Mauser-type ammunition; 110 pounds (approximate) of TNT; two 60-millimeter mortars.

These weapons and ammunition are the same as those used in the North Vietnamese Army. Some of the 7.62-millimeter ammunition was manufactured as recently as 1962.

Materiel is sent into South Vietnam from the North by a variety of methods—overland, by river and canal, and by sea. In one instance Vietnamese troops discovered a

cache in which the 75-millimeter ammunition alone weighed approximately 1½ tons. It has been estimated that it would require more than 150 porters to carry this quantity of ammunition over rough terrain. However, a few sampans, each manned by a few men, could transport it with little difficulty. It is worth noting, in this connection, that the delta where the cache of materiel was seized has 460 miles of seacoast as well as 2,500 miles of canals navigable by large watercraft and another 2,200 miles of canals over which sampans can move easily. Much of the transport of large stocks of ammunition is undoubtedly waterborne for at least much of its travel into South Vietnam.

Large quantities of chemical components for explosives have been sent into South Vietnam for the Vietcong. During 1963 there were at least 15 incidents in which boats, junks, or sampans were seized with explosives aboard. More than 20 tons of potassium chlorate or nitrate were captured. All these cases were in the delta-area, and the majority were on or near the Mekong River. Red phosphorus made in Communist China has been among the chemicals captured from the Vietcong.

The Communists have shown extreme sensitivity to exposure of the fact that war material is going to the Vietcong from North Vietnam, Communist China, and other Communist countries. A secret document captured from a VC agent last year reflected this sensitivity. The document was sent from VC military headquarters in Bien Hoa Province to subordinate units. It ordered them to "pay special attention to the removal of all the markings and letters on weapons of all types currently employed by units and agencies and manufactured by friendly East European democratic countries or by China." It said incriminating marking should be chiseled off "so that the enemy cannot use it as a propaganda theme every time he captures these weapons."

III. NORTH VIETNAM: BASE FOR CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH

The Third Lao Dong Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960 set forth two tasks for its members: "to carry out the socialist revolution in North Vietnam" and "to liberate South Vietnam."

The resolution of the congress described the effort to destroy the legal Government in South Vietnam as follows: "The revolution in the South is a protracted, hard, and complex process of struggle, combining many forms of struggle of great activity and flexibility, ranging from lower to higher, and taking as its basis the building consolidation, and development of the revolutionary power of the masses."

At the September meeting the Communist leaders in the north called for formation of "a broad national united front." Three months later, Hanoi announced creation of the "Front for Liberation of the South." This is the organization that Communist propaganda now credits with guiding the forces of subversion in the south; it is pictured as an organization established and run by the people in the south themselves. At the 1960 Lao Dong Party Congress the tone was different. Then, even before the front existed, the Communist leaders were issuing orders for the group that was being organized behind the scenes in Hanoi. "This front must rally"; "The aims of its struggle are"; "The front must carry out"—this is the way Hanoi and the Communist Party addressed the Liberation Front even before its founding.

The Liberation Front is Hanoi's creation; it is neither independent nor southern, and what it seeks is not liberation but subjugation of the south.

Photographs of additional Vietcong weapons and ammunition of Communist origin are contained in app. E.

In his address to the Third Lao Dong Party Congress, party and government leader Ho Chi Minh spoke of the necessity "to step up the Socialist revolution in the north and, at the same time, to step up the national democratic people's revolution in the south."

The year before, writing for Red Flag, the Communist Party newspaper of Belgium, Ho had said much the same thing: "We are building socialism in Vietnam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution."

In the same vein, the commander in chief of the North Vietnamese armed forces, Vo Nguyen Giap, spoke at the 1960 party congress of the need to "step up the national democratic people's revolution in the south." Earlier in the year, writing for the Communist Party journal Hoc Tap in Hanoi, General Giap described the north as "the revolutionary base for the whole country."

Le Duan, a member of the Politburo and first secretary of the Lao Dong Party, was even more explicit when he talked at the party congress about the struggle in the south and the party's role. After noting the difficulties involved in overthrowing the existing order in South Vietnam, Le Duan said: "Hence the southern people's revolutionary struggle will be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a simple process but a complicated one, combining many varied forms of struggle—from elementary to advanced, legal and illegal—and based on the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary force of the masses. In this process, we must constantly intensify our solidarity and the organization and education of the people of the south."

Another high official of the Hanoi regime, Truong Chinh, writing in the party organ Hoc Tap in April 1961, expressed confidence in the success of the struggle to remove the legal government in South Vietnam because: "North Vietnam is being rapidly consolidated and strengthened, is providing good support to the South Vietnamese revolution, and is serving as a strong base for the struggle for national reunification."

He outlined the steps by which the Communists expect to achieve control over all Vietnam as follows: The Liberation Front would destroy the present Government in the south; a coalition government would be established; this government would agree with the North Vietnamese government in Hanoi regarding national reunification under one form or another. It takes little imagination to understand the form that is intended.

"Thus," wrote Truong Chinh, "though South Vietnam will be liberated by nonpeaceful means, the party policy of achieving peaceful national reunification is still correct."

The official government radio in Hanoi is used both overtly and covertly to support the Vietcong effort in South Vietnam. Captured agents have testified that the broadcasts are used sometimes to send instructions in veiled code to Vietcong representatives in the south.

Hoc Tap stated frankly in March 1963: "They [the authorities in South Vietnam] are well aware that North Vietnam is the firm base for the southern revolution and the point on which it leans, and that our party is the steady and experienced vanguard unit of the working class and people and is the brain and factor that decides all victories of the revolution."

In April 1964 the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party issued a directive to all party echelons. It stated: "When the forces of the enemy and the plots of the enemy are considered, it is realized that the cadres, party members, and people in North Vietnam must * * * increase their sense of responsibility in regard to the South Vietnam

On Jan. 29, 1964, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam supplied the International Control Commission with a list of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment of Communist origin captured in South Vietnam since June 1962. The list is summarized in app. D.

March 3

3942

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

revolution by giving positive and practical support to South Vietnam in every field."

Nguyen Chi Thanh, writing in a Hanoi newspaper in May 1963, underlined the importance of the role of the North Vietnamese Army in Hanoi's plans to unify Vietnam under Communist rule: "Our party set forth two strategic tasks to be carried out at the same time: to transform and build socialism in the north and to struggle to unify the country. Our army is an instrument of the class struggle in carrying out these two strategic tasks."

IV. ORGANIZATION, DIRECTION, COMMAND, AND CONTROL OF THE ATTACK ON SOUTH VIETNAM ARE CENTERED IN HANOI

The VC military and political apparatus in South Vietnam is an extension of an elaborate military and political structure in North Vietnam which directs and supplies it with the tools for conquest. The Ho Chi Minh regime has shown that it is ready to allocate every resource that can be spared—whether it be personnel, funds, or equipment—to the cause of overthrowing the legitimate Government in South Vietnam and of bringing all Vietnam under Communist rule.

A. Political organization

Political direction and control of the Vietcong is supplied by the Lao Dong Party, i.e., the Communist Party, led by Ho Chi Minh. Party agents are responsible for indoctrination, recruitment, political training, propaganda, anti-Government demonstrations, and other activities of a political nature. The considerable intelligence-gathering facilities of the party are also at the disposal of the Vietcong.

Overall direction of the VC movement is the responsibility of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party. Within the central committee a special reunification department has been established. This has replaced the committee for supervision of the south mentioned in intelligence reports 2 years ago. It lays down broad strategy for the movement to conquer South Vietnam.

Until March 1962 there were two principal administrative divisions in the VC structure in the south. One was the interzone of South-Central Vietnam (sometimes called interzone 5); the other was the Nambo region. In a 1962 reorganization these were merged into one, called the central office for South Vietnam. The central committee, through its reunification department, issues directives to the central office, which translates them into specific orders for the appropriate subordinate command.

Under the central office are six regional units (V through IX) plus the special zone of Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh. A regional committee responsible to the central office directs VC activities in each region. Each regional committee has specialized units responsible for liaison, propaganda, training, personnel, subversive activities, espionage, military bases, and the like.

Below each regional committee are similarly structured units at the province and district levels. At the base of the Communist pyramid are the individual party cells, which may be organized on a geographic base or within social or occupational groups. The elaborateness of the party unit and the extent to which it operates openly or underground is determined mainly by the extent of VC control over the area concerned.

1. The Liberation Front: The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam is the screen behind which the Communists carry out their program of conquest. It is the creature of the Communist Government in Hanoi. As noted above the Communist Party in the North demanded establishment of such a front 3 months before its formation was actually announced in December 1960. It was designed to create the illusion that the Vietcong campaign of subversion was truly indigenous to South Vietnam

rather than an externally directed Communist plan.

The front has won support primarily from the Communist world. Its radio faithfully repeats the propaganda themes of Hanoi and Peking. When its representatives travel abroad, they do so with North Vietnamese passports and sponsorship.* The front's program copies that of the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam.

In late 1961, in still another effort to conceal the extent of Communist domination of the front, the Communists announced formation of a new Marxist political unit, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). This mechanism provided a way to explain the Communist presence in the front while at the same time making it appear that the Communist voice was only one of several affiliated organizations in the front. The PRP itself claimed direct descent from the original Indochinese Communist Party and from the North Vietnamese Communist Party in Hanoi.[†]

B. Military organization

Military affairs of the Vietcong are the responsibility of high command of the People's Army of North Vietnam and the Ministry of Defense, under close supervision from the Lao Dong Party. These responsibilities include operational plans, assignments of individuals and regular units, training programs, infiltration of military personnel and supplies, military communications, tactical intelligence, supplies, and the like. The six military regions are the same as those of the VC political organization.

The military structure of the Vietcong is an integral part of the political machinery that controls every facet of VC activity in South Vietnam under Hanoi's overall direction. Each political headquarters from the central office down to the village has a military component which controls day-to-day military operations. Similarly, each military headquarters has a political element, an individual or a small staff. This meshing of political and military activity is designed to insure the closest cooperation in support of the total Communist mission. It also gives assurance of political control over the military.

Associated with the central office, believed to be located in Tay Ninh Province, is a military headquarters. Through this headquarters, as well as through other channels, Hanoi maintains direct contact with its principal military units in the south.

In addition to its supervision of the general military effort of the VC, the military section of the central office is believed to have direct command of two regimental headquarters and a number of security companies.

The hard core of the VC military organization is the full-time regular unit usually based on a province or region. These are well-trained and highly disciplined guerrilla fighters. They follow a rigid training schedule that is roughly two-thirds military and one-third political in content. This compares with the 50-50 proportion for district units and the 70 percent political and 30 percent military content of the village guerrilla's training.

The size of the Vietcong regular forces has grown steadily in recent years. For example, the Vietcong have five regimental headquarters compared with two in 1961. And the main VC force is composed of 50 battalions, 50 percent more than before. There are an estimated 139 VC companies. Hard-

* Pictures of North Vietnamese passports and travel documents used by front officials are in app. F. [Not printed in Record.]

† For evidence that the People's Revolutionary Party in the south and the Communist Lao Dong Party in the north are one party, see app. G.

core VC strength now is estimated at about 35,000, whereas it was less than 20,000 in 1961.

The main force battalions are well armed with a variety of effective weapons including 75-millimeter recoilless rifles and 81-82-millimeter mortars. The companies and smaller units are equally well equipped and have 57-millimeter recoilless rifles and 60-millimeter mortars in their inventory. It is estimated that the Vietcong have at least 130 81-millimeter mortars and 300 60-millimeter mortars. There is no precise estimate for the number of recoilless rifles in their hands, but it is believed that most main force units are equipped with them. In at least one recent action the Vietcong employed a 75-millimeter pack howitzer. This mobile weapon, which has a range of 8,500 yards, will increase the Vietcong capabilities to launch long-range attacks against many stationary targets in the country.

Supporting the main force units of the Vietcong are an estimated 60,000-80,000 part-time guerrillas. They are generally organized at the district level where there are likely to be several companies of 50 or more men each. These troops receive only half pay, which means they must work at least part of the time to eke out a living.

Below the irregular guerrilla forces of the district are the part-time, village-based guerrillas.

They are available for assignment by higher headquarters and are used for harassment and sabotage. They are expected to warn nearby VC units of the approach of any force of the legal government. They provide a pool for recruitment into the VC district forces.

The record shows that many of the village guerrillas are dragooned into service with the Vietcong. Some are kidnapped; others are threatened; still others join to prevent their families from being harmed. Once in the Vietcong net, many are reluctant to leave for fear of punishment by the authorities or reprisal by the Communists.

Lam Van Chuoi is a typical example. He was a member of the village civil defense force in his home village in Kien Giang Province. In March 1960, he was kidnapped by the Vietcong and kept a prisoner in the highlands for 1 month. There he was subjected to intense propaganda and indoctrination. He was returned to his village but kept under close observation and steady pressure. Finally, he was convinced he must join the VC. Later, he was transferred to a Communist military unit in another province. After learning of the Government's open arms program, he decided to defect from the VC. In May 1964, he walked into a Government outpost and asked for protection.

Money to pay the regular VC units comes from a variety of sources. Funds are sent from Hanoi. "Taxes" are extorted from the local population. Landowners and plantation operators often must pay a tribute to the VC as the price for not having their lands devastated. Similarly, transportation companies have been forced to pay the VC or face the threat of having their buses or boats sabotaged. Officials and wealthy people have been kidnapped for ransom. The VC have often stopped buses and taken the money and valuables of all on board.

For the most part, the VC have concentrated their attention on individuals, isolated or poorly defended outposts, and small centers of population. They have mercilessly killed or kidnapped thousand of village chiefs and other local officials. But over the past year the VC have moved into larger unit operations. Their ability to operate on a battalion level or larger has substantially increased.

C. Intelligence organization

A key element in the Vietcong effort is an elaborate organization in Hanoi called the

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3943

Central Research Agency (CRA) (Cục Nghiên-Cuu Trung-Uong). Though it handles Hanoi's intelligence effort on a worldwide scale, the main focus of its operation is on South Vietnam. This agency is able to draw on the intelligence capabilities of both the Lao Dong Party and the North Vietnamese armed forces for information, personnel, and facilities.

The CRA reportedly operates under the close personal scrutiny of Ho Chi Minh himself. Some of the top officials in the Hanoi government reportedly sit on its directing committee, including Premier Pham Van Dong, Deputy Premier Truong Chinh, and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap.

Considerable information on the organization of the CRA has become available from captured Vietcong agents and from the work of intelligence agents of the Republic of Vietnam. Much of this information cannot be made public for security reasons, but it is possible to describe the CRA organization and its operations in broad outline.

The headquarters of the CRA in Hanoi is divided into six main sections, not including a special code unit. The six sections are responsible for administration, cadres, communications, espionage, research, and training. Each section has units to handle the specialized activities of its particular area of responsibility. The research section, for example, has subsections that handle political, economic, and military affairs respectively.

CRA headquarters directs a number of special centers for overseas operations. One such center maintains intelligence channels to overseas areas. It operates through special units at Haiphong and at Hongay.

A second special center is responsible for VC intelligence operations in Cambodia and Laos. A third center handles activities along the "demarcation line," the border with South Vietnam. This unit, based in Vinh Linh in southeast North Vietnam, is responsible for sending agents and supplies to the south by sea. It also cooperates with the North Vietnamese army in planning and carrying out infiltration. The CRA maintains intelligence bases in Laos and other countries.

Inside South Vietnam the Vietcong have a large intelligence network. Some of its units are responsible for receiving and sending on agents arriving from the North. They feed and give instructions to groups infiltrating into South Vietnam. They take delivery of equipment and supplies received from the North and relay them to Vietcong units in the south.

Many Vietcong agents have been captured in Saigon. They have exposed the extensive effort by the CRA to penetrate all Republic of Vietnam Government agencies, foreign embassies, and other specialized organizations. Party and military intelligence units and agents work closely with the CRA.

Each of the main centers operating under CRA headquarters has its own sections and units designed to carry out its main functions. The center at Vinh Linh, responsible for the main infiltration effort of the Vietcong, has separate sections for radio communications, coding, documentation and training, and liaison. It also has specialized units for infiltration through the mountains, infiltration by sea, and "illegal action" in the mountain area.

The CRA maintains a large and expanding radio communications network. Agents also are used to carry messages, usually in secret writing or memorized.

Taken as a whole, the North Vietnamese intelligence operation in support of the Vietcong is one of the most extensive of its kind in the world.⁸

⁸ Charts of the VC organizational structure are in app. H.

V. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HANOI'S CAMPAIGN OF AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM

While negotiating an end to the Indochina war at Geneva in 1954, the Communists were making plans to take over all former French territory in southeast Asia. When Vietnam was partitioned, thousands of carefully selected party members were ordered to remain in place in the south and keep their secret apparatus intact to help promote Hanoi's cause. Arms and ammunition were stored away for future use. Guerrilla fighters rejoined their families to await the party's call. Others withdrew to remote jungle and mountain hideouts. The majority, an estimated 90,000, were moved to North Vietnam.

Hanoi's original calculation was that all of Vietnam would fall under its control without resort to force. For this purpose, Communist cadres were ordered to penetrate official and nonofficial agencies, to propagandize and sow confusion, and generally to use all means short of open violence to aggravate war-torn conditions and to weaken South Vietnam's government and social fabric.

South Vietnam's refusal to fall in with Hanoi's scheme for peaceful takeover came as a heavy blow to the Communists. Meantime, the Government had stepped up efforts to blunt Vietcong subversion and to expose Communist agents. Morale in the Communist organization in the south dropped sharply. Defections were numerous.

Among South Vietnamese, hope rose that their nation could have a peaceful and independent future, free of Communist domination. The country went to work. The years after 1955 were a period of steady progress and growing prosperity.

Food production levels of the prewar years were reached and surpassed. While per capita food output was dropping 10 percent in the north from 1956 to 1960, it rose 20 percent in the south. By 1963 it had risen 30 percent, despite the disruption in the countryside caused by intensified Vietcong military attacks and terrorism. The authorities in the north admitted openly to continuing annual failures to achieve food production goals.

Production of textiles increased in the south more than 20 percent in 1 year (1958). In the same year, South Vietnam's sugar crop increased more than 100 percent. Despite North Vietnam's vastly larger industrial complex, South Vietnam's per capita gross national product in 1960 was estimated at \$110 a person while it was only \$70 in the North.

More than 900,000 refugees who had fled from Communist rule in the North were successfully settled in South Vietnam. An agrarian reform program was instituted. The elementary school population nearly quadrupled between 1956 and 1960. And so it went—a record of steady improvement in the lives of the people. It was intolerable for the rulers in Hanoi; under peaceful conditions, the south was outstripping the north. They were losing the battle of peaceful competition and decided to use violence and terror to gain their ends.

After 1956 Hanoi rebuilt, reorganized, and expanded its covert political and military machinery in the South. Defectors were replaced by trained personnel from party ranks in the north. Military units and political cells were enlarged and were given new leaders, equipment, and intensified training. Recruitment was pushed. In short, Hanoi and its forces in the South prepared to take by force and violence what they had failed to achieve by other means.

By 1958 the use of terror by the Vietcong increased appreciably. It was used both to win prestige and to back up demands for support from the people, support that political and propaganda appeals had failed to produce. It was also designed to embarrass

the Government in Saigon and raise doubts about its ability to maintain internal order and to assure the personal security of its people. From 1959 through 1961, the pace of Vietcong terrorism and armed attacks accelerated substantially.

The situation at the end of 1961 was so grave that the Government of the Republic of Vietnam asked the United States for increased military assistance. That request was met. Meantime, the program of strategic hamlets, designed to improve the peasant's livelihood and give him some protection against Vietcong harassment and pressure, was pushed energetically.

But the Vietcong did not stand still. To meet the changing situation, they tightened their organization and adopted new tactics, with increasing emphasis on terrorism, sabotage, and armed attacks by small groups. They also introduced from the North technicians in fields such as armor and anti-aircraft. Heavier weapons were sent in to the regular guerrilla forces.

The military and insurgency situation was complicated by a quite separate internal political struggle in South Vietnam, which led in November 1963 to the removal of the Diem government and its replacement with a new one. Effective power was placed in the hands of a Military Revolutionary Council. There have been a number of changes in the leadership and composition of the Government in Saigon in the ensuing period.

These internal developments and distractions gave the Vietcong an invaluable opportunity, and they took advantage of it. Vietcong agents did what they could to encourage disaffection and to exploit demonstrations in Saigon and elsewhere. In the countryside the Communists consolidated their hold over some areas and enlarged their military and political apparatus by increased infiltration. Increasingly they struck at remote outposts and the most vulnerable of the new strategic hamlets and expanded their campaign of aggressive attacks, sabotage, and terror.

And official, worker, or establishment that represents a service to the people by the Government in Saigon is fair game for the Vietcong. Schools have been among their favorite targets. Through harassment, the murder of teachers, and sabotage of buildings, the Vietcong succeeded in closing hundreds of schools and interrupting the education of tens of thousands of youngsters.

Hospitals and medical clinics have often been attacked as part of the anti-Government campaign and also because such attacks provide the Vietcong with needed medical supplies. The Communists have encouraged people in rural areas to oppose the Government's antimalaria teams, and some of the workers have been killed. Village and town offices, police stations, and agricultural research stations are high on the list of preferred targets for the Vietcong.

In 1964, 436 South Vietnamese hamlet chiefs and other Government officials were killed outright by the Vietcong and 1,131 were kidnapped. More than 1,350 civilians were killed in bombings and other acts of sabotage. And at least 8,400 civilians were kidnapped by the Vietcong.⁹

Today the war in Vietnam has reached new levels of intensity. The elaborate effort by the Communist regime in North Vietnam to conquer the South has grown, not diminished. Military men, technicians, political organizers, propagandists, and secret agents have been infiltrating into the Republic of Vietnam from the North in growing numbers. The flow of Communist-supplied weapons, particularly those of large caliber,

⁹ For additional details of VC terrorism, see app. I.

has increased. Communications links with Hanoi are extensive. Despite the heavy casualties of 3 years of fighting, the hard-core VC force is considerably larger now than it was at the end of 1961.

The Government in Saigon has undertaken vigorous action to meet the new threat. The United States and other free countries have increased their assistance to the Vietnamese Government and people. Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited Vietnam in 1964, and he promised the Vietnamese: "We shall remain at your side until the aggression from the north has been defeated, until it has been completely rooted out and this land enjoys the peace which it deserves."

President Johnson has repeatedly stressed that the U.S. goal is to see peace secured in southeast Asia. But he has noted that "that will come only when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace."

Through it has been apparent for years that the regime in Hanoi was conducting a campaign of conquest against South Vietnam, the Government in Saigon and the Government of the United States both hoped that the danger could be met within South Vietnam itself. The hope that any widening of the conflict might be avoided was stated frequently.

The leaders in Hanoi chose to respond with greater violence. They apparently interpreted restraint as indicating lack of will. Their efforts were pressed with greater vigor and armed attacks and incidents of terror multiplied.

Clearly the restraint of the past was not providing adequately for the defense of South Vietnam against Hanoi's open aggression. It was mutually agreed between the Governments of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States that further means for providing for South Vietnam's defense were required. Therefore, air strikes have been made against some of the military assembly points and supply bases from which North Vietnam is conducting its aggression against the south. These strikes constitute a limited response fitted to the aggression that produced them.

Until the regime in Hanoi decides to halt its intervention in the south, or until effective steps are taken to maintain peace and security in the area, the Governments of South Vietnam and the United States will continue necessary measures of defense against the Communist armed aggression coming from North Vietnam.

VI. CONCLUSION

The evidence presented in this report could be multiplied many times with similar examples of the drive of the Hanoi regime to extend its rule over South Vietnam.

The record is conclusive. It establishes beyond question that North Vietnam is carrying out a carefully conceived plan of aggression against the South. It shows that North Vietnam has intensified its efforts in the years since it was condemned by the International Control Commission. It proves that Hanoi continues to press its systematic program of armed aggression into South Vietnam. This aggression violates the United Nations Charter. It is directly contrary to the Geneva Accords of 1954 and of 1962 to which North Vietnam is a party. It shatters the peace of southeast Asia. It is a fundamental threat to the freedom and security of South Vietnam.

The people of South Vietnam have chosen to resist this threat. At their request, the United States has taken its place beside them in their defensive struggle.

The United States seeks no territory, no military bases, no favored position. But we have learned the meaning of aggression elsewhere in the postwar world, and we have met it.

If peace can be restored in South Vietnam, the United States will be ready at once to reduce its military involvement. But it will not abandon friends who want to remain free. It will do what must be done to help them. The choice now between peace and continued and increasingly destructive conflict is one for the authorities in Hanoi to make.

APPENDIX A

FINDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION

On June 2, 1962, the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (ICC) sent a special report to the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Soviet Union in their role as cochairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indochina. The ICC is composed of delegates from India (chairman), Canada, and Poland.

In its report the ICC noted the following finding of the Commission's Legal Committee:

"Having examined the complaints and the supporting material sent by the South Vietnamese mission, the committee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the north to the zone in the south with the object of supporting, organizing, and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and administration of the zone in the south. These acts are in violation of articles 10, 19, 24, and 27 of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam.

"In examining the complaints and the supporting material in particular documentary material sent by the South Vietnamese mission, the Committee has come to the further conclusion that there is evidence to show that the PAVN (people's army of Vietnam) has allowed the zone in the north to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting the hostile activities in the zone in the south, aimed at the overthrow of the administration in the south. The use of the zone in the north for such activities is in violation of articles 19, 24, and 27 of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam.

The ICC report then stated:

"The Commission accepts the conclusions reached by the Legal Committee that there is sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt that the PAVN has violated articles 10, 19, 24, and 27 in specific instances. The Polish delegation dissents from these conclusions. On the basis of the fuller report, that is being prepared by the Legal Committee covering all the allegations and incidents, the Commission will take action as appropriate in each individual case."

The full text of the ICC reports is contained in a publication, "Special Reports to the Cochairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indochina" issued by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State on July 2, 1962.

APPENDIX B

INFILTRATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM NORTH VIETNAM INTO SOUTH VIETNAM

(See sec. I, B.)

(Maps showing infiltration routes not printed in the Record.)

APPENDIX C

DETAIL ON MILITARY INFILTRATION WITH CASE STUDIES

(See sec. I, B, and C.)

The following table shows the scale of infiltration of military personnel from North Vietnam into the South since 1959. The confirmed list is based on information on

infiltration groups from at least two independent sources.

Year	Confirmed	Estimated additional	Total
1959-60	1,800	2,700	4,500
1961	3,750	1,650	5,400
1962	5,400	7,000	12,400
1963	4,200	3,200	7,400
1964	4,400	3,000	7,400
Total	19,550	17,550	37,100

Brief case histories of typical Vietcong who were sent into South Vietnam by the authorities in Hanoi follow:

Name: Le Van Thanh.

Alias: Huu Tam.

Date and place of birth: July 12, 1936, Hoa Hao hamlet, Cat Tai village, Phu Cat district (Binh Dinh).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Lieutenant, formerly platoon leader of signal platoon of 3d Battalion, 90th Regiment, 324th Division.

VC position in South Vietnam: Platoon leader of signal platoon of 95th Battalion, 2d Regiment, 5th Inter-Region.

Date entered South Vietnam: Departed November 27, 1961, arrived Do Xa station early February 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied to government at Nhon Loc post, Nghia Hanh district (Quang Ngai), May 24, 1962.

Name: La Thanh.

Alias: Nguyen Ba Tong—La Giao.

Date and place of birth: 1928, Can Tho city (Phong Dinh).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Senior sergeant, formerly squad leader in charge of construction of barracks for 338th Division.

VC position in South Vietnam: Squad leader, 8th Squad, 3d Platoon, 3d Company, 218B Battalion (War Zone D).

Date entered South Vietnam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 15; departed April 4, 1962, arrived War Zone D early August 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied at Cau Song Be (bridge) post September 8, 1962, with 1 MAS 36.

Name: Le Van Quyen.

Alias: Ho Hal, Hong Thanh.

Date and place of birth: 1928, Tan Binh Than village, Cho Gao district (My Tho).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Lieutenant, formerly assigned to 388th Brigade, as instructor on heavy weapons such as 57 mm. recoilless rifle and machinegun.

VC position in South Vietnam: Platoon leader, 2d Platoon, 2d Company, Infiltration Group 15.

Date entered South Vietnam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 15; departed April 3, 1962, arrived Suoi Da (War Zone D) September 10, 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied at Hieu Liem district (Phuoc Thanh) October 7, 1962.

Name: Nguyen Van Do.

Party name: Thanh Minh.

Infiltration alias: Nguyen Thuan.

Date and place of birth: 1923, Thuan Giao village, Lai Thieu district (Binh Duong).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Senior captain (battalion commander) 1st Battalion, 338th Brigade.

VC position in South Vietnam: Subject was to be appointed commander of Phuoc Tuy Province Main Force Battalion.

Date entered South Vietnam: Commander of Infiltration Group H. 26; departed Xuan Mai, Ha Dong (North Vietnam) July 4, 1963; arrived Ban Me Thuot October 23, 1963.

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied at Ban Don post, Ban Me

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3945

Thout, October 23, 1963, while guiding Group H. 26 to Hai Yen Zone.

Name: Nguyen Thanh Phi.

Party name: Hung Phuong.

Infiltration alias: Nguyen Tu.

Date and place of birth: November 16, 1926, Thanh Van village, Thanh Chuong district (Nghe An).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Doctor, chief of internal disease section, Tlep Viet Hospital.

VC position in South Vietnam: Doctor, health team leader, 5th Region base construction group (Do Xa).

Date entered South Vietnam: March 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured by South Vietnamese armed forces May 4, 1963, with one 12-millimeter Colt pistol and five rounds.

Name: Le Van Net.

Party name: Le Hung Tien.

Infiltration alias: Le Na.

Date and place of birth: 1924, Tan Hiep village, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong.

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Discharged lieutenant, served in Co Dinh chromite mine (Thanh Hoa) with grade of senior sergeant.

VC position in South Vietnam: Senior sergeant, 6th Squad, 2d Platoon, Infiltration Group H. 26.

Date entered South Vietnam: Late June 1963 with Infiltration Group H. 26.

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured November 16, 1963, by inhabitants in strategic hamlet in Ban Me Thout (Dar-

lac) with one Communist Chinese rifle and 70 rounds.

Name: Van Cong Khanh.

Party name: Pham Tien.

Date and place of birth: 1924, An Hol village, Chau Thanh district (Kien Hoa).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Discharged and reassigned to Co Dinh chromite mine (Thanh Hoa) as senior sergeant.

VC position in South Vietnam: Aspirant, leader of 7th Squad, 3d Platoon, 608th Engineer Company subordinate to Headquarters Region 7.

Date entered South Vietnam: Accompanied Group 49, infiltrated into South Vietnam, March 18, 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: captured November 23, 1962, in Bung Dia hamlet.

Name: Nguyen Thanh Hoa.

Party name: Quoc.

Infiltration alias: Nguyen Quoc Trung.

Date and place of birth: 1917, Phong Coc village, Ha Nam canton (Quang Yen).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Captain, discharged and reassigned to Chi Ne agricultural camp May 1957.

VC position in South Vietnam: Commander, 4th Main Force Battalion.

Date entered South Vietnam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 52; departed Xuan Mai, April 13, 1961, arrived about August 1961.

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured by South Vietnamese Armed Forces with 1 PA 38 (pistol) in Quon Long (Dinh Tuong) August 1962.

Name: Tran van Khoa.

Alias: Tran Hong Hai.

Date and place of birth: 1935, Giong Gach hamlet, An Hiep village, Ba Tri district, Ben Tre Province (Kien Hoa).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Sergeant, formerly driver of Transportation Group 3 of (Hanoi) Logistical Bureau.

VC position in South Vietnam: Member of 46th Infiltration Company; cover designation V. 2 (infiltrated unit).

Date entered South Vietnam: Accompanied the 46th Infiltration Company; departed for South Vietnam, April 17, 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured by South Vietnamese Rangers in ambush (after being wounded) along with one MAS 36, July 7, 1962, in Phuoc Long Province.

APPENDIX D

LIST OF COMMUNIST WEAPONS CAPTURED IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(See sec. II.)

On January 29, 1964, the Government of Vietnam submitted to the International Control Commission a list of weapons and other military equipment which had been captured from the Vietcong. The weapons and equipment came from Communist sources outside South Vietnam and obviously had been introduced clandestinely into the country in support of the Vietcong campaign of conquest, directed by Hanoi.

I. Chinese Communist origin

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
75-millimeter recoilless rifle	1	Sept. 10, 1963	An Xuyen Province.
Do	1	Dec. 2-6, 1963	Do.
Do	1	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Total	3		
57-millimeter recoilless gun	1	Nov. 25, 1962	Phuoc Chau in Quang Tin (1 gun and 7 gun carriages).
Do	1	Dec. 5, 1962	Phu Bon (1 gun carriage).
Do	2	Aug. 31, 1963	Province of Quang Ngai.
Total	13		
Shells for 75-millimeter gun (shells bear markings in Chinese characters. On some shells markings were scratched out and replaced by "American" markings.)	8	Nov. 24, 1963	Province of An Xuyen.
Do	120	Dec. 22, 1963	Operation Due Thang at Dinh Tuong.
Total	128		
Shells for 57-millimeter gun	49	Nov. 25, 1962	Phuoc Chau, Province of Quang Tin.
Do	8	Feb. 20, 1963	Vietcong attack on the post of Ben Heo (Tay Ninh).
Do	33	May 24, 1963	On a Vietcong vessel on the Bassac River.
Do	6	Aug. 31, 1963	Quang Ngai.
Do	1	Oct. 8, 1963	Province of Binh Dinh.
Do	58	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Total	155		
80-millimeter mortar	1	Mar. 25, 1963	Province of Tay Ninh.
60-millimeter mortar	1	Jan. 7, 1963	Phuoc Thanh.
Do	2	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Total	3		
Shells for 60-millimeter mortar	18	Sept. 10, 1963	Province of An Xuyen.
Do	165	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Total	183		
90-millimeter bazooka	1	Dec. 22, 1963	Do.
Caliber 27-millimeter rocket launcher	2	June 10, 1962	Provinces of Quang Ngai and Quang Due
Total	3		
Caliber 7.92-millimeter model 08 Maxim machinegun	2	Sept. 10, 1963	Province of An Xuyen.
Do	4	Dec. 21, 1963	Chuong Thien.
Total	6		
MP-82 rocket	142	Apr. 24, 1963	Quang Ngai.
TNT explosives (charges)	365	June 13, 1962	Quang Due.
Do	43	Nov. 25, 1962	Phuoc Chau (Quang Tin).
Do	29	May 7, 1963	Can Tho.
Do	140	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Total	577		

¹ Guns plus 8 gun carriages.

3946

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

March 3

I. Chinese Communist origin—Continued

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
Red phosphorous (kilograms).....	5	Apr. 19, 1963.....	Province of Kien Phong.
Potassium chlorate (tons).....	17	September 1962.....	On a Vietcong vessel at Phu Quoc.
Do.....	2	Apr. 19, 1963.....	Province of Kien Phong.
Potassium chlorate (kilograms).....	150	July 10-15, 1963.....	Phu Quoc.
Total:			
Tons.....	19		
Kilograms.....	155		
Cartridges for 7.92-millimeter machinegun.....	100,000	Dec. 22, 1963.....	Dinh Tuong.
Detonating fuses for 60-millimeter mortar shell.....	150	do.....	Do.

II. Soviet origin

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
MP-82 rifle.....		May 10, 1962.....	Binh Dinh.
Launching cartridges.....		do.....	Do.
Mossin Nagant carbine (with automatic bayonet).....	1	June 13, 1963.....	Kien Phong.
Do.....	2	July 13, 1963.....	Long An.
Do.....	5	July 20, 1963.....	Dinh Tuong.
Do.....	7	Sept. 8, 1963.....	Do.
Total.....	15		
Rifles.....	6	Oct. 6, 1963.....	Long An.
Do.....	1	Oct. 19, 1963.....	Dinh Tuong.
Do.....	11	Nov. 6, 1963.....	Vinh Binh.
Do.....	1	Nov. 17, 1963.....	Dinh Tuong.
Do.....	1	Nov. 23, 1963.....	Hau Nghia.
Do.....	1	Dec. 6, 1963.....	Dinh Tuong.
Do.....	8	Dec. 7, 1963.....	Phong Dinh.
Do.....	1	Dec. 12, 1963.....	Kien Tuong.
Do.....	1	Dec. 13, 1963.....	An Xuyen.
Do.....	1	Dec. 16, 1963.....	Kien Giang.
Do.....	1	do.....	Ba Xuyen.
Do.....	3	do.....	An Xuyen.
Do.....	1	Dec. 17, 1963.....	Phong Dinh.
Do.....	1	Dec. 20, 1963.....	Kien Hoa.
Do.....	6	Dec. 21, 1963.....	Chuong Thien.
Do.....	2	Dec. 22, 1963.....	Dinh Tuong.
Total.....	46		
Automatic pistol.....	1	Oct. 19, 1963.....	Phan Thiet.
Grenades.....	5		Long An.
Rifle cartridges.....	160,000	Dec. 22, 1963.....	Dinh Tuong.
Submachinegun (machine pistol).....	2	Sept. 23, 1963.....	Long Xuyen.

III. Czech origin

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
7.65-millimeter automatic pistol.....	1	Jan. 2, 1963.....	On person of Vietcong leader arrested at Phu Yen.
K-60 submachinegun.....	2	Nov. 25, 1962.....	Quang Tin.
Do.....	1	Nov. 29, 1962.....	Phuoc Long.
Do.....	7	Apr. 24, 1963.....	Quang Ngai.
Do.....	5	May 9, 1963.....	Quang Tin.
Do.....	2	July 11, 1963.....	Operation Hau Giang.
Do.....	3	Aug. 31, 1963.....	Quang Ngai.
Do.....	1	Sept. 8, 1963.....	Dinh Tuong.
Do.....	1	Sept. 16, 1963.....	Long An.
Do.....	1	Oct. 17, 1963.....	Quang Nam.
Do.....	2	Nov. 13, 1963.....	Phu Yen.
Do.....	1	do.....	At Hue.
Do.....	9	Oct. 8, 1963.....	Binh Dinh.
Do.....	1		Operation Phuoc Binh Thang.
Do.....	1	Dec. 30, 1963.....	Kien Hoa.
Do.....	1	Dec. 25, 1963.....	Chuong Thien.
Do.....	1	Dec. 17, 1963.....	Long Xuyen.
Total.....	40		
Rifles.....	9	Sept. 10, 1963.....	An Xuyen.
Do.....	1	Oct. 19, 1963.....	Chuong Thien.
Do.....	1	Nov. 6, 1963.....	Ba Xuyen.
Do.....	2	Nov. 9, 1963.....	Chuong Thien.
Do.....	3	Nov. 13, 1963.....	Kien Giang.
Do.....	1	Nov. 17, 1963.....	Ba Xuyen.
Do.....	2	Nov. 20, 1963.....	Hau Nghia.
Do.....	1	Dec. 2, 1963.....	Phong Dinh.
Do.....	6	Dec. 21, 1963.....	Chuong Thien.
Total.....	26		
Machinegun cartridges.....	14,000	Dec. 22, 1963.....	Dinh Tuong.
Grenade launcher.....	1	July 14, 1963.....	Long An.
8.5 antitank bazooka.....	1	Dec. 22, 1963.....	Dinh Tuong.

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3947

IV. (a) Weapons and ammunition modified by the Regular Army of North Vietnam

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
Modified MAT-49.....	16	Nov. 25, 1962.....	Quang Tin.
Do.....	2	Dec. 5, 1963.....	Phu Bon.
Do.....	6	Nov. 13, 1963.....	
Total.....	24		
12.7-millimeter machinegun.....	2	Nov. 24, 1963.....	Operation at Duo Hoa.

IV. (b) Material and equipment of North Vietnamese manufacture

Uniform.....		Dec. 21, 1962.....	Phuoc Thanh.
Helmets.....	16	Oct. 8-10, 1963.....	Kien Hoa.
Socks.....	(1)	Dec. 21, 1962.....	Phuoc Thanh.
Sweaters (made in Ha Dong).....	(1)		Do.
Belts (made in Hanoi).....	(1)		Do.
Messkits (made in Haiphong).....	(1)		Do.

¹ No number given.

APPENDIX E

PHOTOS OF CAPTURED VIETCONG WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION FROM EXTERNAL COMMUNIST SOURCES

(See sec. II.)

The following are photographs of some of the many weapons and the large stocks of ammunition supplied to the Vietcong in South Vietnam from external Communist sources (not printed in the Record).

APPENDIX F

NORTH VIETNAMESE PASSPORTS AND TRAVEL DOCUMENTS USED BY LIBERATION FRONT OFFICIALS

(See sec. IV, A, 1.)

Huynh Van Nghia and Nguyen Van Tien are officials of the "National Liberation Front of South Vietnam." Though they profess to be citizens of South Vietnam, their ties are with and their support comes from North Vietnam and the Communist regime in Hanoi. In 1963, when the two men traveled abroad on front business, they traveled as North Vietnamese with passports and other documents issued by the Hanoi regime.

Photographs of these documents follow (not printed in the Record).

APPENDIX G

THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (SOUTH) AND THE LAO DONG PARTY (NORTH) ARE ONE COMMUNIST PARTY

(See sec. IV, A.)

In May 1962 a military force of the Government of Vietnam captured a number of Vietcong documents in Ba Xuyen Province. One of these documents contained instructions from the provincial committee of the Lao Dong Party (Communist Party) in Ba Xuyen to the party's district committees concerning formation of the new People's Revolutionary Party (PRP).

Pertinent sections of the instruction, dated December 7, 1961, follow:

"To D2 and K:

"In regard to the foundation of the People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam, the creation of this party is only a matter of strategy; it needs to be explained within the party; and, to deceive the enemy, it is necessary that the new party be given the outward appearance corresponding to a division of the party (Lao Dong) into two and the foundation of a new party, so that the enemy cannot use it in his propaganda.

"Within the party, it is necessary to explain that the founding of the People's Revolutionary Party has the purpose of isolating the Americans and the Ngo Dinh Diem regime, and to counter their accusations of an invasion of the South by the North. It is means of supporting our sabotage of the Geneva agreement, of advancing the plan of invasion of the South, and at the same time permitting the Front for Liberation of the South to recruit new adherents, and to gain

the sympathy of nonaligned countries in southeast Asia.

"The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence; actually, our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Vietnam (Vietminh Communist Party), unified from North to South, under the direction of the central executive committee of the party, the chief of which is President Ho. * * *

"During these explanations, take care to keep this strictly secret, especially in South Vietnam, so that the enemy does not perceive our purpose. * * *

"Do not put these explanations in party bulletins."

Another party circular of the same date said:

"The reasons for the change in the party's name must be kept strictly secret. According to instructions of the Central Committee, one must not tell the people or party sympathizers that the People's Revolutionary Party and the Lao Dong Party of Vietnam are one. One must not say that it is only a tactic, because it would not be good for the enemy to know."

A third party circular, dated December 8, 1961, said:

"Study the instructions so that you will be able to execute them. In passing them to D2V, D2, and K, be very careful that the documents do not fall into enemy hands. After D2N/C has passed to the sections, destroy the written documents immediately."

The originals and translations of the above documents were submitted to the International Control Commission by the Government of Vietnam on May 30, 1962.¹

¹ For picture of captured documents and text, see the white paper "Communist Viet-

In 1964 new rules and regulations were promulgated for the People's Revolutionary Party. A copy of the new rules was captured from the Vietcong in Chuong Thien Province in November 1964. A photograph of the captured document appears on the next page. Key portions of the instructions said that new rules and regulations had been approved for the PRP, "but the real nature of those rules and regulations is that they still are the rules and regulations of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party (in North Vietnam)."

The instructions added: " * * * we should realize that our country is one country, that the Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party and the Vietnam Lao Dong Party are one party. * * * There is nothing different between the two parties."

APPENDIX H

CHARTS OF THE VIETCONG ORGANIZATION, NORTH AND SOUTH

(See sec. V.)

Lines of control, political and military, from the Hanoi regime to the Vietcong in South Vietnam (charts not printed in the Record).

APPENDIX I

DETAIL ON VIETCONG TERRORISM

(See section V.)

The following table lists the Government officials and other civilians killed, wounded, or missing as a result of Vietcong terrorist activities during 1964. Combat casualties are not included.

minh Aggressive Policy," published by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, Saigon, July 1962.

Village, district, and other Government officials

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Killed.....	47	34	40	30	25	31	45	30	46	48	21	24
Wounded.....	14	16	24	9	8	9	14	15	13	10	22	7
Kidnaped.....	93	113	91	67	74	132	93	103	144	69	62	100
Total.....	154	163	164	106	107	172	152	154	203	127	95	131

Other civilians

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Killed.....	111	110	138	115	105	110	181	103	132	100	66	88
Wounded.....	146	174	239	218	163	173	194	122	203	90	94	154
Kidnaped.....	604	560	1,531	647	727	483	964	834	778	477	200	398
Total.....	951	874	1,908	980	995	766	1,339	1,059	1,113	667	360	740

The following table shows the number of incidents of Vietcong terrorism, sabotage, forced propaganda sessions, and armed attacks during 1964:

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Attacks.....	223	217	208	220	175	140	184	113	116	83	60	96
Terrorism.....	1,244	1,389	1,632	1,738	1,418	1,390	2,123	1,775	1,938	1,790	1,391	1,719
Sabotage.....	129	201	158	169	217	176	286	315	482	460	247	318
Propaganda.....	174	271	187	157	140	162	224	173	178	197	109	128

Some of the consequences of Vietcong terrorism are shown in the accompanying photographs [not printed in the Record].

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. VANIK). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Montana [Mr. OLSEN] is recognized for 30 minutes.

[Mr. OLSEN of Montana addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT AS SEPARATE AND COEQUAL INSTITUTIONS

(Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama (at the request of Mr. McCLORY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, one of the key essentials of the U.S. Constitution is the establishment and maintenance of the three branches of our Government as separate and coequal institutions, each playing its own important function.

Proper operation of the Government requires that we continually work to retain the integrity and efficiency of each branch. We are always concerned with improving the functions of Congress so that as representatives of the people we in the National Legislature may serve their interests. And we also now are rightly working to assure that our system of presidential disability and succession will always provide us with the best possible continuity and operation of the executive branch.

It is also appropriate that we concern ourselves with the judicial branch as the principal safeguard of justice for all our citizens. With that in mind I am introducing today a bill designed to assure that Supreme Court Justices would have judicial experience as a qualification.

Specifically, my bill would require that no person be appointed as a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court unless, at the time of his appointment, he would have had at least 10 years prior service either as a Judge of a Court of Appeals of the United States or as a Judge of the highest court of any State.

The bill would not, of course, apply to the present Supreme Court Justices and is not intended in any way to impugn the ability of these gentlemen. It would apply only to future appointments.

The vast number of cases coming before the Supreme Court today, the long delays in consideration of these cases because of the great workload, and the immense complexity and serious nature of the issues involved, require that judicial experience be a substantial part

of the background of individuals confronted by these gigantic responsibilities.

Surely the framers of the Constitution did not foresee a situation in which, of the nine Supreme Court Justices, only three would have previous judicial experience with this experience totaling only 9 years. And yet that is the situation we have today.

On the contrary, the Constitution was written with the intention of utilizing the best of the country's judicial wisdom and experience in helping to meet the country's greatest judicial needs.

Some of our most thoughtful observers have pointed out the requisites of superior Justices: a great intellectual humility, a respect for stability, for tradition, and for conventional wisdom, and a thorough understanding of how the judicial system works in our Federal courts.

The Court should not be charged with the responsibility of legislative innovation. It should operate, rather, as the check of a farseeing and stable wisdom on actions of the other two branches of Government which may reflect short-term needs or relatively temporary conditions.

Above all, as Hamilton wrote, it is essential that the Court remain "truly distinctive from both the executive and legislative branches."

These proper functions of the U.S. Supreme Court can best be performed by Justices who carry with them the unique experience of a judicial background.

For these reasons, I submit my bill and request that it be given early consideration.

A THREAT TO SOIL CONSERVATION

(Mr. FINDLEY (at the request of Mr. McCLORY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, the proposal to establish a revolving fund financed by farmers and ranchers replacing the traditional soil conservation services of the Department of Agriculture is a grave threat to a program which has served our country as well as individual farmers in splendid fashion for 30 years. Of all of the activities of the Department of Agriculture, this should be the last one to feel the economy axe.

In all the years I have been associated with farmers, I have yet to hear one word of criticism of the dedication and effective service of the soil conservationists of the Department of Agriculture. They provide valuable professional and technical advice to the farmers, a service that enriches the entire Nation.

In this era of colossal waste, not only in commodity farm programs but in many other activities of Government, it

is so ironic and tragic that this splendid Service should be singled out for attack.

Here is an excellent summation of the situation I just received in the mail:

ADAMS COUNTY
SOIL CONSERVATION DISTRICT,
Quincy, Ill., February 26, 1965.

HON. PAUL FINDLEY,
House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

HONORABLE SIR: The Adams County Soil and Water Conservation District is greatly concerned about the proposed cutback in Federal support for conservation programs in the 1966 budget for the Department of Agriculture. We are particularly opposed to a proposal in the budget that Congress authorize a revolving fund through which soil and water conservation districts, and individual farmers and ranchers, would make \$20 million in payments to the Federal Government for scientific and technical assistance provided by the Soil Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture.

We directors of the district believe that the conservation of soil and water is in the public interest; otherwise, we and our predecessors on the district board would not have been willing to give of our time unstintingly without pay, to promote conservation in our district. Why should a policy of 30 years' standing which has been proved successful be changed? Of all Government programs, the Soil Conservation Service has come in for the least amount of public criticism. The new proposed policy seems to be to protect the Federal lands but charge all private lands for assistance on conservation measures. We know that 73 percent or more of the land in this country is privately owned and it is to the interest of the country that this land be protected to meet the growing demands that are and will be made of it by the population explosion.

Soil erosion and sediment is the source of silt which pollutes our streams and rivers. The shortage of water in many places is another of our serious problems facing the future of the Nation. The urban and industrial shortages of water experienced in the middle and eastern part of this country and the damages sustained in the western part should alone cause our national leaders to look with alarm toward protection against a recurrence. Such protective measures would fall on private lands. Should owners pay all the cost in order to give protection to urban and industrial areas?

We believe that our district would have trouble in raising the thousands of dollars needed for our share in the revolving fund. The records show that we have been one of the high producing districts in the State of Illinois on applying conservation to land. However, our records show that we have been working mostly with those farmers in the problem land areas of the county and to ask these farmers to pay for our services would multiply the financial burden on those least able to afford it.

Data taken from the 1959 U.S. Census of Agriculture for Adams County show that we have 1,911 commercial farms which are divided according to gross income as follows:

Class I: \$40,000 and over, 39 farms, 2 percent.

Class II: \$20,000 to \$40,000, 165 farms, 8.6 percent.

Class III: \$10,000 to \$20,000, 567 farms, 29.7 percent.

Class IV: \$5,000 to \$10,000, 630 farms, 33 percent.

Class V: \$2,500 to \$5,000, 375 farms, 19.6 percent.

Class VI: \$50 to \$2,500, 135 farms, 7.1 percent.

From these figures it is not hard to see what the effect of the proposed reduction in funds would do. Those in the low income brackets could not afford to pay for our serv-

concerned with the preservation of our true freedom, or we shall all destroy ourselves in a fearful jungle of our own creating. Government in attempting to steer us truly into conformity with the laws of nature and of our own being is working to save us from ourselves, to preserve our freedom against the most deadly of freedom's poisons. There is no danger that besets us today which is more grave than this: that we shall fail to understand the nature and demands of freedom and, in so failing, extinguish freedom's life in our midst.

The man or woman who today fails to place his own interest and rights second to the interest and rights of the most deprived members of our society is working for the destruction of this good society as surely as is any enemy overseas.

Government cannot guarantee to preserve us from ourselves, but government can restrain us from outright suicide. Our present course could become a suicide course unless we choose better. Government, school, and church can help us to will to choose a better way.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY DEMOCRATIC STEERING COMMITTEE PERTAINING TO THE COMMUNIST EFFORT OF AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM

(Mr. MADDEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, on yesterday the House Democratic steering committee held its monthly meeting and passed the following resolution pertaining particularly to the Communist effort of aggression in Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, the resolution reads, as follows:

"Whereas the the Congress on August 10, 1964, adopted a joint resolution to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia;

"Whereas the Communist regime in North Vietnam has continued and intensified since that date its attacks against the people and the Government of Vietnam;

"Whereas evidence presented in the publication of the Department of State entitled 'Aggression From the North' establishes beyond question that North Vietnam is carrying out a carefully conceived plan of aggression against South Vietnam;

"Whereas the United States has joined with the people and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam in a collective defense against this aggression;

"Whereas the only purpose of the United States in southeast Asia is to enable the countries of that area to enjoy their freedom in peace: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved, That the Democratic steering committee stands behind the President in the measures he is taking to assist the Government and the people of the Republic of Vietnam to defend themselves against the aggression being directed against them from North Vietnam."

It is hoped that in this vital issue facing the Nation you will join the House leadership in supporting the President.

Now, Mr. Speaker, I might add in addition thereto that the Democratic steering committee yesterday passed a resolution endorsing the Appalachian legislation, without amendments.

GOV. PAT BROWN AND THE FOREIGN LABOR PROGRAM

(Mr. TEAGUE of California asked and was given permission to address

the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. TEAGUE of California. Mr. Speaker, on behalf of the Republican delegation in the House of Representatives from the State of California I would like to extend our thanks to Gov. Pat Brown, of California.

Mr. Speaker, this expression of gratitude comes a little late because the reason for it was far too long delayed.

Mr. Speaker, our California Republican delegation, over a month ago, adopted a resolution by unanimous vote requesting the Governor to assist California in its very, very difficult farm labor problem by attempting to persuade the Secretary of Labor to come to the conclusion that we do have a tragic and urgent situation in California and that we must have some temporary supplemental foreign labor if our crops are to be harvested and tens of thousands of domestic jobs in packing, transportation and related industries are to be saved. At that time the Governor refused to do so. However, he has now recognized the realities of the situation and is cooperating to some extent at least. We are truly grateful that he has now seen the light—or at least partially so.

Mr. Speaker, this same delegation has adopted a new resolution which follows hereafter.

The matter referred to follows:

Believing that the 88th Congress terminated Public Law 78 in a sincere belief that more jobs would be developed for domestic workers, but now

Being convinced that tens of thousands of net domestic jobs will be lost unless adequate temporary supplemental farm labor is immediately assured; and

Being informed that numerous tomato canneries (as well as other canners and processors) have been unable to contract for fruit and vegetables because of an anticipated labor shortage and knowing therefore that many domestic cannery workers and those engaged in allied industries will be unable to find work this season; and

Being reliably advised that many California food processing companies have acquired plants in Mexico and intend to transfer major portions of their business from California to Mexico because they cannot be assured of adequate labor in the United States; and

Having ample evidence that many California ranchers and farmers are seriously considering moving their operations to Mexico; and

Being ever mindful that when tomatoes are not planted, when citrus products are not packed, and when vegetables spoil in the fields, the whole economy of California will suffer and thousands of workers dependent upon, or allied with, agriculture—packing-house workers, package manufacturers, truckers, salesmen, bankers, as well as farmers—will be detrimentally affected; and

Realizing the adverse effects upon our already unfavorable balance of international payments condition that will certainly occur when large U.S. growers, processors, and shippers move their operations to Mexico and sell fresh and frozen food products to the United States for U.S. dollars; and

Recognizing the probability that the multi-million-dollar export volume of California fruit and vegetables will no longer be possible; and

Being completely satisfied that California growers and public officials have exhausted every practicable proposal to recruit competent domestic farm labor; and being assured that all domestic efforts cannot produce an adequate supply of farm labor during this season; and

Earnestly submitting that time is of the essence,

We, the Republican Members of the California delegation of the Congress of the United States, representing the most populous State of the Union and the No. 1 agricultural State, whose principal industry is supplying the rest of the States with fresh, canned, and frozen fruits, and vegetables, acting individually, and jointly, unanimously resolve, and

Respectfully urge the President of the United States and the Secretary of Labor to recognize the present worsening conditions of California agriculture creating a serious emergency, to utilize Public Law 414 and to immediately certify the admission of sufficient temporary, supplemental farm workers to assure California growers that their crops can be harvested without spoilage; and

We urgently implore the Secretary of Labor to amend his regulations to equalize wage rates for agricultural workers among all of the States and to terminate the current discrimination against California.

Executed at Washington, D.C., March 1, 1965.

DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

(Mr. SAYLOR asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SAYLOR. Mr. Speaker, the recent transfer of a New York policeman to an undesirable beat because of a remark to a traffic offender, blessed with diplomatic immunity, reopens a subject on which Congress must assert itself unless the State Department produces some assurance that it is able and willing to resolve the issue.

While it is obvious that a very great majority of foreign diplomats headquartered in Washington scrupulously adhere to the laws of the land and of the District, and make no attempt to take advantage of their immunity status, there is nevertheless too much flagrant abuse of this sanctity on the part of the embassies to overlook the situation. Since most of the disrespect of local rules and regulations centers on traffic violations, there is a tendency to avoid severe scrutiny into the matter. In consequence, too many drivers with DPL tags look with scorn upon police officers who by experience have learned—as in the case of the New York policeman—that it is highly unprofitable to tangle with a diplomat, regardless of how belligerent he may become.

In Washington, according to the State Department, efforts at reducing parking violations on the part of the diplomatic corps have been encouraging in recent months, though the average American motorist who has occasion to drive around this city may fail to notice the improvement. It is no rarity to find that the traffic block ahead on a busy morning has been caused by a double-parked embassy car whose driver is nowhere in sight. While it may be too much to expect the visitor from Johnstown, Indiana, or Kittanning to have the same privileges accorded embassy drivers whose countries of origin have enjoyed the beneficence of this country's foreign aid program paid for by those hapless citizens from back home, it is nevertheless time that methods of obtaining a little more equity be explored. Soon the throngs of visitors from the several States will be coming to Washington to visit the Capi-

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3933

the former residents of the North, the East, and West. Out of this blending process has come a healthy union of minds, the extension of transportation facilities, industrial development, and rapid transition from agrarian to urban status.

Yes, much has taken place in Florida over the past 120 years, but—the way things seem to be going—the progress of the past is very likely to be dwarfed in significance by that of the future.

So, I point with pride, Mr. Speaker, to Florida's 120th anniversary as a State. Her fabled sun-climate is unequaled anywhere. Florida is the vacation spot which is sought out by all the Nation. Florida's people are as colorful and varied as her terrain. The names of Ponce de Leon, DeSoto, and, yes, even Gaspar and Lafitte lend credence to her emergence as a lusty and energetic entity. The name of Florida has come to be synonymous with exciting, progressive, happy living.

HOW FREE IS FREE?

(Mrs. GREEN of Oregon asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend her remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mrs. GREEN of Oregon. Mr. Speaker, recently there has come to my attention a most challenging speech given by J. Irwin Miller, of Columbus, Ind. Mr. Miller's subject is entitled "How Free Is Free?" This speech was given at a recent award dinner in Indianapolis.

J. Irwin Miller is a former president of the National Council of Churches, a trustee of the Committee for Economic Development, the Ford Foundation, and Yale University, chairman of the board of Cummins Engine Co., in addition to other positions of great responsibility in the business world. I believe that in very clear terms Mr. Miller gives meaning and substance to the word "freedom" which is so heavily under attack these days by political primitives.

I recommend this to my colleagues:

HOW FREE IS FREE?

(By J. Irwin Miller)

In our recent national discussions on civil rights, on the proper role of government, and on the fate of the individual, we too often make the mistake of not beginning at the beginning. We plunge directly into arguments about our present circumstances and what we do not like about them as if somehow, were everything changed to suit us, the world would be set right.

Now it is quite true that we live in an age where the forces of bigness, especially of big government, are making themselves felt upon the individual. It is further true that these forces may even, one by one, be taking the individual's liberties away from him.

The trend started when government first started. With the coming of primitive governments, our distant ancestors lost the freedom to murder their neighbors. With the establishment of our own new and revolutionary government, our young individuals lost the freedom not to go to school. They were deprived of the right to choose to be illiterate.

My great-grandfather kept a cow in his front yard in downtown Columbus. That freedom is now denied me. I even have to chain or fence my dog. We have lost the freedom to manufacture impure foods, to sell

narcotics, to run open gambling houses, and to keep slaves. What are things coming to?

Now this isn't wholly funny. We once had each of these freedoms. Were those times better times? Would we choose to return to them? I think we would not like to return to them, and I think there is some profit in asking ourselves why we choose not to return to a wholly unregulated society.

Let us begin by asking which society is truly the freer society? When one man murders another man, there are two freedoms involved, not one freedom. There is the freedom to murder at will, and there is the freedom not to be murdered at will. Since you cannot grant one of these freedoms without denying the other freedom, you come up against a fact that seems to be all but overlooked in today's debate: Freedoms compete with each other.

When you have to deal with competing freedoms, it follows that you may have to choose one freedom as being more desirable than its competing freedom, and you are therefore forced, as a society, to deny one freedom in order to grant the other. In recognition of this inevitable state of affairs, our ancestors generations ago decided that the freedom not to be murdered was a more desirable freedom than the freedom to murder.

One man's freedom to own slaves denies to another man the freedom not to be enslaved. One man's freedom to keep pigs inside the city limits denies to another man the freedom to drink pure water. And so on into areas a great deal less dramatic, where the competing freedom is more easily obscured and the choice a great deal more difficult to make.

MY PROPERTY RIGHTS

The house in which I live is my house. Surely I should be allowed to rent or sell to persons of my own choice. If private property does not mean that, what does it mean? I have built a business which now employs many people. I will survive competition only if I choose my employees very carefully. If I cannot choose my own workers for my own business, what does private enterprise mean? Or if I cannot choose whom I will serve or whom I will not serve in my restaurant, my store, my lunch counter, if I am not free to do that, what is left for me of this free society we all talk so much about?

The key word here, I think, is the word "me," "my," "mine." What do I mean when I say my house, my business, my restaurant? Does anything happen to the worth of my house if the firemen have no concern for fires in the neighborhood, or the policemen about robberies in the neighborhood, or the neighbors about trash and weeds in their front yards, or about thoughtless ill-trained children in their families?

ACCORDING TO FOUNDING FATHERS

Back in 1783, one of our Founding Fathers had some thoughts on the subject. In that year Benjamin Franklin wrote to another Founding Father, Robert Morris, and this is what he said:

"All property, except the savages temporary cabin, his bow, his matchcoat and other little acquisitions absolutely necessary for his subsistence, seems to me the creature of public convention. Hence the public has the right of regulating descents and all other conveyances of property, and even of limiting the quantity and the uses of it.

"All the property that is necessary to a man for the conservation of the individual and the propagation of the species is his natural right, which none may justly deprive him of, but all property superfluous to such purposes is the property of the public who, by their laws, have created it and who may therefore, by other laws, dispose of it whenever the welfare of the public shall demand such disposition. He that does not like so society on these terms, let him retire and live among savages. He can have no right to the

benefits of society who will not pay his club toward the support of it."

What does that last word "club" mean? I had to hunt to find out, but I learned from the dictionary that in the 17th and 18th centuries one meaning was "A combination of contributions to make up a total sum." So what is Ben Franklin saying? Is it not something like this: Everything which I call mine and to which I attach most worth is a combination of continuous contributions voluntarily given by others. If they withhold their contributions, which many are free to do; my neighbors—their manners and thoughtfulness; my workers—their willingness to work honestly for me; my customers—their willingness to buy from me; if they withhold all these contributions, then my property, my house, my business each has a very great deal less worth to me, if indeed any worth at all.

Franklin is saying further: You or I have no right to this combination of voluntary contributions which I call my private property unless I too make my club—offer my voluntary contributions to the property and rights of others—in amounts and quantity sufficient to confer on their private property the worth which I wish to attach to my property. To Ben Franklin suppliers, shareholders, workers, managers, customers, even the communities in which they are located, are all, in effect, owners of a business, which must be run and managed in the interest of each, not neglecting the others.

FROM JUDEO-CHRISTIAN TEACHINGS

Our Judeo-Christian tradition has even more frightening advice for us. We are told in Christian Gospel that he that would save his life (what more valuable piece of private property?) must lose it; that a man must order his life, operate and employ his property for others or their value to him will vanish.

We have a long-established newspaper in my State which carries every day at the top of its front page a memorable piece of scripture, scripture that is concerned with freedom and liberty: "Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." And what is this spirit of the Lord? The first public words uttered by Jesus spoke of it: "He opened the book and found the place where it was written 'The spirit of the Lord is upon me, because He has anointed me to preach good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty those who are oppressed to proclaim the year of the Lord's favor.'"

Liberty for each of us is found not at all, unless it be found in a dominant sacrificial concern for the liberty of the other fellow, and especially the deprived and disadvantaged. Property has no value for any of us unless each of us has a primary care for the property rights of the other fellow, and especially of the other fellow least able to look out for himself.

HOW FREEDOMS ARE LOST

Ben Franklin, through his hard experience in building a society in the New World, and Jesus and the prophets in their wisdom, all saw here a law as immutable, as inexorable as the law of gravity—a law which, if violated, brought penalties as severe as those which attend the violation of any of the laws of the physical universe. So the surest way to lose freedom to own a home of one's choosing is to attempt to deny that freedom to another. The surest way to lose the free access to learning and education is to deny that freedom to someone less powerful than oneself. The surest way to lose the freedom to run my business is to run it on contempt of the general interest.

Government may fall into this error, too, and enact arrogant or unwise laws. But government cannot, therefore, be barred from this field any more than we should be barred from owning a house simply because some are bad householders. Government must be

know I speak for all her colleagues in wishing that we may continue to have the benefit of her wise counsel and legislative skill for many, many more years to come.

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Speaker, we note with pride and congratulations the quarter-century of service our distinguished colleague from Ohio, FRANCES P. BOLTON, completes this day. Her courage, dedication, and graciousness have made this service noteworthy in every way. On the Foreign Affairs Committee, where she serves as the ranking minority member, she has battled for policies and programs which would make our world leadership strong and objective. Particularly sensitive to the needs and aspirations of less developed nations, she had made countless friends in these areas, projecting an appealing image of American sympathy and understanding. We salute our colleague as an able Member of our body whose devoted efforts are of great significance to this Nation and, indeed, the world. May she long continue her distinguished service.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, I am often asked whether I approve public careers for members of the fairer sex. Immediately, I always first think of the gentlelady from Ohio as a prime example of the highest in statesmanship, from whatever source. She is, indeed, an able national leader, even international, and an efficient advocate for her district and State as well. She is the friend of every Member of Congress; and I am glad that includes me particularly. I am delighted to congratulate her on her 25 years here in the House and wish for her many years of able service in the future.

Mr. McCLODY. Mr. Speaker, the opportunity to serve in the U.S. House of Representatives with FRANCES P. BOLTON, of Ohio, has been and is a rich and valued experience.

In recognizing her 25 years of distinguished service, the Members of the House are taking appropriate note of a public leader who has made her mark in the history of our Nation.

Mrs. BOLTON is well known for her public service in Illinois and throughout the other 49 States. As a colleague and as Representative of Illinois' 12th District, I am proud to join in honoring and congratulating Representative FRANCES P. BOLTON on the 25th anniversary of her service in the Congress.

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, it gives me great pleasure to join with my colleagues in paying tribute to a truly great woman and public servant, Mrs. FRANCES PAYNE BOLTON, from the 22d District of Ohio, as she celebrates a dedicated and distinguished 25 years of service here in the House of Representatives.

The State of Ohio is indeed proud to place this wonderful lady in the annals of fame as she has so unselfishly contributed much time and effort here in this body on behalf of her constituency as well as the entire Nation by her outstanding position as ranking minority member on the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mrs. BOLTON is not only a lady of dignity, but one of dedication, intellect, and talent. Her wise counsel is frequently solicited and genuinely heeded and it gives me great pleasure for this oppor-

tunity to congratulate her on a magnificent record of accomplishment. With warm pride and happiness, I extend my heartfelt thanks for her guidance and wisdom. I hope the Nation will have the benefit of her service for many years to come.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. McCULLOCH. Mr. Speaker, I now ask unanimous consent that all Members may extend their remarks at this point in the RECORD on this subject.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio? There was no objection.

[Mrs. BOLTON addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

JOHN F. KENNEDY—YEARS OF LIGHTNING, DAY OF DRUMS

(Mr. ZABLOCKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I asked for this time to remind our colleagues that this afternoon at 1:30 p.m., 3:50 p.m., and 5 p.m. in the caucus room there will be a showing of the USIA film "John F. Kennedy—Years of Lightning, Day of Drums."

Members were notified by letter signed by 17 Members of Congress and are invited, as are their staff.

SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT ON SOUTH VIETNAM

(Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, the affirmative, positive action which we have been taking the past few weeks in South Vietnam is a clear indication of the attitude of the President and meets with the approval, I am sure, of a vast majority of the American people and a vast majority of the Members of this House.

For years, many members of the House Armed Services Committee, and I among them, have stated over and over again that the Communists understand only one kind of language—the language of force and strength.

We are taking the war to the Communists, and they are beginning to feel the effects of our bombings.

I wanted to take this opportunity to express my wholehearted approval of the actions taken by the President of the United States which I am confident will have a salutary effect, not only upon the Soviet Union and the Vietcong, but also Red China.

There may come a time when negotiation will be in order. That time will arrive when we negotiate from a position of strength. I am sure I can speak for every member of the House Armed Services Committee when I say we will do everything within our power to give the President and the Department of Defense, members of our armed services, and the American people, the men and the materiel necessary to place us in a position in South Vietnam where if nego-

tiations are initiated, we will negotiate not as a supplicant seeking help, but as a victor dispensing justice.

Mr. Speaker, I commend the President. He needs our support. He is doing the job we want him to do and we must stand behind him.

HON. FRANCES P. BOLTON

(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to join my colleagues in paying tribute to the remarkable and distinguished gentlewoman from Ohio [Mrs. BOLTON]. I am not only familiar with her unusual record of service in the House but I claim a distinction probably not shared by any other of the Members, to wit, that I am a cousin of the distinguished gentlewoman. She is a member of what she herself describes as the Bingham clan. May I say that she, as one who was born a Bingham, has made her many cousins throughout the country proud of their name.

SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT ON SOUTH VIETNAM

(Mr. WAGGONER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WAGGONER. Mr. Speaker, I want to express my appreciation to the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS] for having brought again to the attention of the House the position of the United States with regard to Vietnam. I want to assure the gentleman from South Carolina and the other Members of this House and anyone else who is interested that the words he has just spoken do speak for me as one Member of this House. I add my hope again as I have before that they speak for every Member of this House in support of the President in this matter. He deserves our support and he needs it. There is as has been said nothing to be negotiated now. I ask the question, if we don't stand here then where do we stand? I believe most Americans mean it when they say they are tired of continually yielding to the Communists. I assure you I am.

BIRTHDAY GREETINGS TO HON.

ROBERT H. MICHEL

(Mr. ANDREWS of North Dakota asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ANDREWS of North Dakota. Mr. Speaker, today is a special day for one of our colleagues. He is known as a singer of some ability, a softball player of congressional renown, an ardent basketball fan of the teams from his alma mater, but, more important, known as an able legislator and a distinguished representative of the people of his district.

Our colleague is a member of Cosmopolitan International, sponsors of six consecutive student science fairs in his

home city. He has been the recipient of a Distinguished Alumnus Award from Bradley University.

And so, his fellow members of the Cosmopolitan Club of Peoria, Ill., join with me in extending best wishes for a happy birthday to our colleague, BOB MICHEL.

TELEPHONE SERVICE NO LONGER A LUXURY

(Mr. HARSHA asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, I want to urge President Johnson and Congress to give serious consideration to permitting the Federal excise tax on telephone service to expire on June 30, 1965.

Other utilities such as electricity, gas, and water enjoy exemption from this tax; yet, excise tax on telephone service remains as a part of our revenue system, imposing an unjust burden on the telephone companies and their consumers. It is a discriminatory public utilities tax which was never intended to be permanent.

No longer can telephone service be considered a luxury. It is an essential household item needed by the people in the conduct of their everyday affairs. In this day and age, telephone service is a necessity. Many people rely on this service to do their shopping, to be informed as to their work, as a means of communication between their children and emergency agencies. For many, it is the only means of contact with law-enforcement officials, with the fire department, doctors, and hospitals.

Originally enacted by Congress as a wartime emergency measure, this tax was intended to be one of short duration. It has long outlived that period and should be allowed to expire without any further extension proposed.

Many have urged that Congress eliminate excise taxes now, but may I remind my colleagues that we are now in the fourth quarter of fiscal 1965 and this anticipated revenue has already been committed for expenditure and in many cases already expended. To eliminate this revenue now would be to add to an already large deficit for fiscal 1965. The more responsible action would be to let the present tax expire as it will on June 30. Then the budget for fiscal 1966 can be adjusted accordingly and expenditures can be reduced accordingly before they are committed or even expended, and thus not add to the predicted deficit for 1966.

CRIMINAL LEGISLATION

(Mr. MATHIAS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Speaker, the difficulty with criminal legislation is that it applies to everyone. A general law acts with impartial force upon the law-abiding as well as upon the lawless. A limitation upon the liberties of the criminal must necessarily restrict the liberties of the innocent.

A law that is intended to discourage crime and to restrain criminals may also have the effect of condemning and restricting the innocent and the honest. Since the great and overwhelming majority of Americans are decent, honest and lawful, such criminal legislation is totally unacceptable.

In my judgment the so-called omnibus crime bill recently approved by the Whitener subcommittee falls within this category and I shall oppose it in committee and in the House.

I applaud the President's goal of "establishment in the District of a model system which will best achieve fair and effective law enforcement." I support the President's intention to appoint a commission to concern itself specifically with crime and law enforcement in the District. But this situation does not stand still. The crime rate is increasing and the job is getting bigger. The President will have to act promptly and effectively to attain this goal he has announced. If the President delays in taking the leadership in this matter he will surely witness the commission of bad crimes and the enactment of bad laws.

If the President will act with energy and speed, I am confident that many Members of Congress will join with me in pledging ourselves to work with the commission, with the District authorities and the Metropolitan Police, with the bench and bar, and with the civic minded citizens of the District of Columbia to give the District a model code.

HOUR OF MEETING ON THURSDAY

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, in connection with the arrangements for the ceremonies commemorating the 100th anniversary of the 2d inaugural address of Abraham Lincoln, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns tomorrow it adjourn to meet at 11:15 on Thursday morning.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

MESSAGE ON CITIES—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 99)

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

Throughout man's history, the city has been at the center of civilization. It is at the center of our own society.

Over 70 percent of our population—135 million Americans—live in urban areas. A half century from now 320 million of our 400 million Americans will live in such areas. And our largest cities will receive the greatest impact of growth.

¹In this message the word "city" is used to mean the entire urban area—the central city and its suburbs.

Numbers alone do not make this an urban nation. Finance and culture, commerce, and government make their home in the city and draw their vitality from it. Within the borders of our urban centers can be found the most impressive achievements of man's skill and the highest expressions of man's spirit, as well as the worst examples of degradation and cruelty and misery to be found in modern America.

The city is not an assembly of shops and buildings. It is not a collection of goods and services. It is a community for the enrichment of the life of man. It is a place for the satisfaction of man's most urgent needs and his highest aspirations. It is an instrument for the advance of civilization. Our task is to put the highest concerns of our people at the center of urban growth and activity. It is to create and preserve the sense of community with others which gives us significance and security, a sense of belonging and of sharing in the common life.

Aristotle said: "Men come together in cities in order to live. They remain together in order to live the good life."

The modern city can be the most ruthless enemy of the good life, or it can be its servant. The choice is up to this generation of Americans. For this is truly the time of decision for the American city.

In our time, two giant and dangerous forces are converging on our cities: the forces of growth and of decay.

Between today and the year 2000, more than 80 percent of our population increase will occur in urban areas. During the next 15 years, 30 million people will be added to our cities—equivalent to the combined population of New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, and Baltimore. Each year, in the coming generation, we will add the equivalent of 15 cities of 200,000 each.

Already old cities are tending to combine into huge clusters. The strip of land from southern New Hampshire to northern Virginia contains 21 percent of America's population in 1.8 percent of its areas. Along the west coast, the Great Lakes, and the Gulf of Mexico, other urban giants are merging and growing.

Our new city dwellers will need homes and schools and public services. By 1975 we will need over 2 million new homes a year. We will need schools for 10 million additional children, welfare and health facilities for 5 million more people over the age of 60, transportation facilities for the daily movement of 200 million people and more than 80 million automobiles.

In the remainder of this century—in less than 40 years—urban population will double, city land will double, and we will have to build in our cities as much as all that we have built since the first colonist arrived on these shores. It is as if we had 40 years to rebuild the entire urban United States.

Yet these new overwhelming pressures are being visited upon cities already in distress. We have over 9 million homes, most of them in cities, which are run down or deteriorating; over 4 million do not have running water or even plumbing.